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ELY AT THE ALTAR: POLITICAL PROCESS
THEORY THROUGH THE LENS OF
THE MARRIAGE DEBATE
Jane S. Schacter*
Political process theory, closely associated with the work of John
Hart Ely andfootnote four in United States v. Carolene Products,
has long been a staple of constitutional law and theory. It is best
known for the idea that courts may legitimately reject the decisions
of a majority when the democratic process that produced the decision was unfair to a disadvantaged social group. This Article
analyzes politicalprocess theory through the lens of the contemporary debate over same-sex marriage. Its analysis is grounded in
state supreme court decisions on the constitutionality of barring
same-sex marriage, as well as the high-profile, recent trial in federal court on the constitutionality of California's Proposition 8,
which featured extended testimony by opposing political scientists
on gay and lesbian politicalpower The Article argues that the marriage debate reveals deep conceptual problems with process theory
as it has been conventionally understood, and that looking at the
theory through this lens can point the way to refashioning it in both
doctrinal and conceptual terms. It calls for a more substantive and
nuanced conception of democratic equality, as well as a more realistic institutionalunderstandingof courts and the politicalprocess.
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INTRODUCTION

John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust'and the iconic footnote four in
United States v. Carolene Products' ("footnote four") are the most wellknown exemplars of a genre of constitutional theorizing that goes by the
name of "political process theory." This approach has given constitutional
law a simple, but central, principle of institutional architecture: the idea that
a court's ability to override a legislative judgment ought to be calibrated
based on the fairness of the political process that produced the judgment.
Stated at a high level of generality, the theory has a long lineage, traceable
to, among others, McCulloch v. Maryland.? In its contemporary form, however, the principle has been most prominently associated with the more
specific idea that judicial scrutiny should increase when a socially subordinated group cannot compete fairly in the political process. That version of
the idea was famously framed in terms of "discrete and insular minorities"
in footnote four,4 and was raised to a new level of scholarly prominence by
Ely's theory of representation reinforcement! The process-based logic of
the argument has been offered as an appealing way to operationalize equal
protection guarantees without dragging courts into endlessly contested debates about substantive values and ideas.
Ely's book has celebrated its thirtieth year in print, and footnote four is
well past its seventieth birthday. Despite the passage of time, however,
political process theory remains a subject of academic fascination. It is a
staple of constitutional law casebooks and classes, and thousands of law
review articles have cited Ely or footnote four.6 Perhaps process theory
1.

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).

2.

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).

3. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 428-29 (1819) (reasoning that the state of Maryland could not impose a tax on a national bank where the federal government was not represented in
the state legislature).
4.

CaroleneProds., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.

5.

ELY, supra note 1, at 101-04.

6. A LexisNexis search of the American Law Journals database for <"Democracy and Distrust"> on September 5, 2010 yielded more than 3,000 articles. A LexisNexis search of the Supreme
Court database for <"Democracy and Distrust"> on September 5, 2010 yielded 18 cases since the
book was first published in 1980. An identical search in the LexisNexis Courts of Appeals database yielded 53 cases, and the same search yielded 33 cases in the U.S. District Courts database. A
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lingers because of the sheer elegance of the idea that majoritarian malfunctions rightly demand a nonmajoritarian correction. Or perhaps the longevity
is better attributed to the magnetic normative appeal of a principle that is
grounded in fairness, dispenses with the need for elaborate institutional
analysis, and claims to resolve the countermajoritarian difficulty-all without breaking a sweat. Not bad for an idea that can be stated in a sentence or
two.
The canonical status of the idea notwithstanding, however, an earnest
observer could be forgiven for concluding that process theory has not turned
out to matter all that much in constitutional theory or law. Its signature
claim-to be about process and not substance-has long since been eviscerated. In the same year that Ely's book appeared, his then-colleague
Laurence Tribe published a fairly devastating takedown of the idea that
process theory could deliver on its eponymous promise to eschew controversial substantive questions.! Tribe argued that "[t]he process theme by itself
determines almost nothing unless its presuppositions are specified, and its
content supplemented, by a full theory of substantive rights and values-the
very sort of theory the process-perfecters are at such pains to avoid."8 This
critique went squarely to the heart of process theory, and other scholars offered powerful critiques of their own.
Moreover, there is little evidence that process theory has powerfully influenced constitutional decisions. Footnote four, and Ely's embrace of it as
an aspect of representation-reinforcement theory,'o show up most clearly in
the law of equal protection. In that context, the Court has traditionally pursued separate tiers of scrutiny in analyzing governmental classifications.
One of the several factors that the Court has identified as relevant to determining whether a group merits special judicial solicitude is whether the
group has been relegated to "such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.""
Notwithstanding the prominent doctrinal place occupied by the idea of
political powerlessness, however, it has mostly fizzled in the case law. In
those cases in which the Supreme Court has adopted a standard of heightened scrutiny, it has almost never made a finding of political
LexisNexis Shepard's Report for Carotene Products generated on September 5, 2010 yielded 3,883
law review articles, 90 U.S. Supreme Court cases, and 581 cases from the lower federal courts.
7. Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-BasedConstitutional Theories,
89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1063-64 (1980).
Id. at 1064.
9. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 716-17
(1985); Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 131, 131 (1981); Daniel R. Ortiz,
Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REv. 721, 722
(1991).
8.

10. In Democracy and Distrust, Ely set out two principles of representation reinforcement,
one concerning the problem of entrenchment and the other the problem of bias. See infra text accompanying note 41. Only the latter is at issue in this Article.
11. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). The other standard
factors are a history of discrimination, the imposition of disabilities based on stereotypes and unrelated to merit, and (sometimes) a group disadvantage based on an immutable characteristic. See id.
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powerlessness.12 Indeed, the cases raising scrutiny in the areas of race and
gender do not even invoke the idea of political powerlessness." Moreover,
the use of strict scrutiny to strike down affirmative action programs challenged by whites has called sharply into question the notion that such
scrutiny is plausibly connected to protecting groups lacking power in the
political process.14 And the Court has not, in any event, heightened scrutiny
for any new classification in decades."
Notwithstanding these signs of dormancy, if not decimation, process
theory seems to have made something of a splashy comeback in one of the
most salient socio-legal debates of the day-the debate over same-sex marriage. The question whether members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender ("LGBT") community are candidates for heightened scrutiny
under equal protection principles has been framed as a central question in
many lawsuits on the issue, and the "political powerlessness" idea has
drawn sustained analysis." As they have applied state law analogues of the
Equal Protection Clause, several state supreme court opinions-on both
sides of the marriage question-have probed the question whether LGBT
persons lack political power in the ways deemed significant by process the17
ory.
More recently, the issue came to the fore in Judge Vaughn Walker's
courtroom, as part of the high-profile trial on the constitutionality of California's Proposition 8 ("Prop. 8"), a measure that reversed a state supreme
court decision in favor of marriage equality.' In August 2010, Judge Walker
ruled Prop. 8 unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' He did so after holding a twelveday trial at which several witnesses testified on questions raised by conventional equal protection doctrine, including the history of discrimination
12.

For an exception, see infra Section I.B.1 and its discussion of Graham v. Richardson.

13. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (race). Note that Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 685-87 (1973) (plurality opinion), would have been the counterexample had it secured a
fifth vote. See discussion infra Section I.B. .
14.

See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).

15. Birth outside wedlock was the last. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); Lalli v. Lalli,
439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). For a discussion of "heightened
rational basis," see infra Section I.B.2.
16. The issues addressed in this Article concern members of the LGBT community. In their
opinions, courts that have grappled with these issues frequently refer only to "gay" or "gay and
lesbian" persons, and have not separately analyzed at any length the implications for bisexual or
transgendered persons. The issues of political power discussed here, however, implicate the broader
LGBT community. For ease of reference, I use both the terms commonly used by courts-"gay" or
"gay and lesbian"-and the broader term "LGBT." I intend no substantive distinction between the
terms.
17.

See infra Section I.B.2.

18. See generally Jesse McKinley & John Schwartz, California's Ban on Gay Marriage is
Struck Down, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at Al.
19. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal.), stay denied, 702 F. Supp. 2d
1132 (N.D. Cal. 2010), stay granted, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010), and certifying
question to the Supreme Court of California, 628 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2011).
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against gay people, the origins of sexual orientation in individuals, and the
extent to which gay people do (or do not) possess sufficient political power
to protect themselves in the political process. 20 The testimony offered on the
absence or presence of gay political power was especially striking. It pitted
two political scientists against one another-Gary Segura of Stanford for
those challenging Prop. 8, and Kenneth Miller of Claremont McKenna for
those defending it. 2 1 Over the course of many hours and more than 600
combined pages of trial transcript, the dueling experts debated in great detail
the quality and quantity of gay political power, with Segura emphasizing the
22
gay community's political vulnerabilities and Miller its political strengths.
Notably, the proponents of Prop. 8 elected to offer only two witnesses at the
trial (as against the plaintiffs' seventeen), and one of them was on the political power question. 23
In his lengthy opinion, Judge Walker parsed the testimony on political
power at length and ultimately found the prerequisites for heightened scrutiny to be satisfied. Nevertheless, he also found that even the more minimal
scrutiny of rationality review was not satisfied in the case of Prop. 8, and he
struck down the measure on that basis. It thus remains to be seen whether
and how the evidence on political power will figure in appellate decisions
on the constitutionality of Prop. 8. Whether or not this testimony takes center stage in that case, however, it is likely that questions about gay political
power in particular, and process theory in general, will persist in the samesex marriage debate. That debate has long been characterized by a sharp
clash between the courts and the political process. It was a court-the Hawaii Supreme Court-that ignited the current controversy in 1993 with a
decision portending the imminent legalization of same-sex marriage in that
24
state. Since then, the controversy has been shaped and structured by the
ongoing actions and reactions of courts, legislators, and voters acting on
ballot measures. 25 Seven states have at some point allowed same-sex couples

20. The American Foundation for Equal Rights has compiled a day-by-day set of trial transcripts for Perry v. Schwarzenegger. Transcripts, AM. FOUND. FOR EQUAL RIGHTS, http://
www.equalrightsfoundation.org/our-work/hearing-transcripts/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
21.
Segura testified on Days 7 and 8 of the trial. Transcript of Proceedings at 1523-736,
1747-881, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292-VRW).
Miller testified on Days 10 and 11. Id. at 2414-579, 2587-715. This was not the first faceoff of
expert witnesses on this question, but it was the most detailed and protracted. Competing political
scientists testified as expert witnesses in the trial of Amendment 2, the anti-gay rights initiative
ultimately struck down by the Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans, 516 U.S. 620 (1996). See LISA
KEEN & SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW: GAY PEOPLE ON TRIAL 105-31 (1998)
(reviewing the Amendment 2 testimony on gay political power offered by Professors Kenneth Sherrill, for the plaintiffs, and James David Woodard, for the state of Colorado).
22.

See supra note 10 and accompanying text.

23.

Plaintiffs offered eight lay witnesses and nine experts. Perry, 704 F Supp. 2d at 944-53.

24. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.), reconsiderationgranted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw.
1993), appeal after remand sub nom., Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), and order aff'd,
950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997).
25. The history is laid out in Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage
Equality Litigation Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 1153 (2009).
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to marry: Massachusetts (2003),2 California (2008),27 Connecticut (2008),28
Iowa (2009),29 New Hampshire (2009),'o Vermont (2009),' and Maine
(2009).32 Voters in California and Maine rejected marriage equality at the
ballot box," while the other five states still allow same-sex marriage. 4 Of
the seven states, four acted by judicial decisions requiring marriage equality
(Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, and Iowa); one acted by legislation
that was preceded by a judicial decision requiring, at a minimum, comprehensive civil unions in the state (Vermont); and two acted by legislation with
no judicial role (New Hampshire and Maine). Nor has activity been confined to these seven states. Several additional states have extended civil
union or domestic partnership protections to same-sex couples.35 On the
other hand, forty-one states have passed anti-same-sex marriage measures,
including thirty that have banned same-sex marriage in their state constitu-

26. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (finding that the
Massachusetts Constitution protects the right of same-sex couples to marry).
27. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional
amendment, California Marriage Protection Act, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss
v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (applying strict scrutiny to find that laws preventing same-sex
couples from marrying violated the California Constitution).
28. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (finding that the
Connecticut Constitution protects the right of same-sex couples to marry).
29. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (upholding lower court's ruling that a
statute banning same-sex marriages violated the Iowa Constitution).
30. On June 3, 2009, New Hampshire Governor John Lynch signed a bill legalizing
same-sex marriage, codified as R.S.A. 457:1-457:3. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1-:3 (2004 &
Supp. 2010); Eric Moskowitz & Martin Finucane, N.H. becomes sixth state where gays can
marry, Bos. GLOBE, June 7, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking-news/2009/06/
nhlegislature.html.
31. Same-sex marriage became legal in Vermont on September 1, 2009, after both houses of
the legislature voted to override Governor Jim Douglas's veto. See David Abel, Vermont lawmakers
legalize gay marriage, Bos. GLOBE, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.boston.comInews/local/breaking
news/2009/04/vermontlawmake.html.
32. A bill allowing same-sex marriage passed the Maine legislature and was signed into law
in early 2009; the law was put on hold, however, because opponents successfully petitioned for a
statewide referendum. Maria Sacchetti, Maine voters overturn state's new same-sex marriage law,
Bos. GLOBE, Nov. 4, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/locallmaine/articles/2009/l 1/04/maine_
voters overturn states newsame_sexmarriagejlaw/.
33. The voters in California and Maine have voted down same-sex marriage through statewide ballot measures. For discussion of the California initiative, known as Proposition 8, see infra
note 105. For more information on the Maine referendum, known as Question 1, see Kevin Miller &
Judy Harrison, Gay marriage repealed in Maine, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Nov. 3, 2009,
http://www.bangordailynews.com/detail/128048.html.
34. The District of Columbia also allows same-sex marriage, having enacted legislation. See
Ann E. Marimow & Keith L. Alexander, First gay marriages in Districtperformed, WASH. POST,
Mar. 10, 2010, at B01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/03/09/AR2010030901904.html.
See Relationship Recognition for Same-Sex Couples in the U.S. Map, NAT'L GAY &
TASK FORCE, http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issuemaps/rel recog_9
10_color.pdf (last updated Sept. 13, 2010).
35.

LESBIAN
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tions. Thus, from an early point, the debate has featured a pitched institutional battle about which body--courts? legislatures? the electorate?should decide who may marry.
Rather than considering the effect of political process theory on the
constitutionality of banning same-sex marriage, however, I would like to
look from the other end of the telescope. The question I take up in this
Article is what can we learn about political process theory-its status, its
conceptual coherence, its viability-from the same-sex marriage controversy. Quite a lot, I will suggest. The theory is, on close examination,
riddled with uncertainties, vacuities, anachronisms, internal contradictions,
empirical implausibilities, and assorted other difficulties, large and small. I
will argue that process theory is grounded in thin and sometimes caricatured
ideas about courts and politics that, in turn, misunderstand the dynamics of
equality movements. I will emphasize that process theory lacks the internal
normative apparatus to answer the very question it makes central-whether
a group is sufficiently disadvantaged in the political process to warrant special judicial solicitude. The theory also makes problematic categorical
assumptions about the extent to which courts can and will stand apart from
the biases that suffuse the political process and the larger social forces that
shape that process. The flaws in these assumptions are particularly visible in
the marriage debate, where it is-paradoxically-courts in states that have
already legislated in favor of gay rights that have been willing to find the
LGBT community to be politically powerless, rather than courts in states
where the legislative process has been unremittingly hostile to those rights.
Identifying where process theory goes wrong can help to bring into focus a better picture of the institutional dynamics at work in these
movements, and can suggest how the inquiries launched by process theory
can and should be reframed. In particular, analyzing process theory from
this perspective can point the way toward both doctrinal revisions and a
more fundamental rethinking of the idea of democratic equality that animates Ely, footnote four, and the approach that they have both come to
represent. I argue that a normatively important core principle can be extracted from process theory, but only at a high level of abstraction. The point
worth salvaging is that animus and hierarchy compromise democratic equality in ways inconsistent with the principle of equal protection. But this
ought to be an unapologetically substantive ideal of democratic citizenship,
not a principle claiming to find justification in the logic of value-free proceduralism.

36.

For more detailed information, see State Laws Prohibiting Recognition of Same-Sex

Relationships Map,

NAT'L

GAY

&

LESBIAN

TASK

FORCE,

http://www.thetaskforce.org/

downloads/reports/issue-maps/samesex relationships_7_09.pdf (last updated June 30, 2009).
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I. A BRIEF TOUR OF PROCESS THEORY

A. Foundations of Process Theory
The origins of process theory, as it is conventionally understood, trace to
the famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products." In Carolene
Products, the Court upheld regulation of filled-milk products in what would
otherwise be a mundane decision seldom read or remembered. Justice Stone
put the case on the map when he dropped a footnote sketching out three categories of circumstances that warrant judicial review more aggressive than
what the Court gave the milk regulation it upheld in the case. The footnote
said:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment
than are most other types of legislation [going on to cite cases involving
restrictions upon the right to vote, restraints upon the dissemination of information, interferences with political organizations, and prohibition of
peaceable assembly].
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious or national or racial
minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarilyto be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
** 38
inquiry.
The third category-and especially the language about the democracycorroding effects of prejudice against discrete and insular minoritieslaunched political process theory in its now-recognizable form. While the
footnote identified prejudice against discrete and insular minorities as a
pivot point, it did not try to offer any crisp rule or clearly enforceable doctrine. Instead, the language was couched in notably contingent, even
speculative, prose. This was consistent with the footnote's relatively modest
aspiration, according to Justice Stone's law clerk at the time, to offer "a
starting point for debate," with the hope of generating "thoroughgoing
analysis and discussion by bar, bench, and academe."' 9 What-if anything37.

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).

38.

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

39. Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1098-99 (1982).
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would become of the invitation was not immediately clear. A historical
analysis of the footnote suggests that it was, in fact, decades before it came
to be used in support of the basic principles of process theory.4 0
The meaning and significance of the "discrete and insular minorities"
language was most influentially developed and drawn out in Ely's 1980
book, Democracy and Distrust. In the book, Ely identified two central political malfunctions that he saw courts as equipped to address through
judicial review, the second of which is pertinent to this Article. According to
Ely, courts are equipped to review malfunctions when:
(1) [T]he ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that
they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though no one is actually
denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority
are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or
a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby
denying that minority the protection afforded other groups by a representative system.4 1
Ely justified singling out these as the two central malfunctions to be addressed by courts through judicial review based on ideas about the centrality
of protecting fair process and participation. And his defense of these principles showed that the resemblance between them and paragraphs two and
three of the footnote was not coincidence:
I have suggested that both Carolene Products themes are concerned with
participation: they ask us to focus not on whether this or that substantive
value is unusually important or fundamental, but rather on whether the opportunity to participate either in the political process by which values are
appropriately identified and accommodated, or in the accommodation
those processes have reached, has been unduly constricted.4 2
Ely was animated by a desire to avoid constitutional rules that placed
judges in what he regarded as the democratically dangerous position of
making contested choices based on the open-textured language in the Constitution. Thus, he offered up his principles as matters of neutral process that
could be employed without the need to adjudicate controversial normative
debates. Ely's proposition was that "prejudice is a lens that distorts reality"
and thus makes it impossible for chronic victims of prejudice to get a fair
shake in the "pluralist's bazaar" of politics. 43 His antidote was to enlist
judges as democratic referees of a sort who could reinforce the deficient
representation rendered to disadvantaged groups through appropriately
skeptical judicial review. As Tribe's critique exemplifies, Ely's aggressive
flight from substance proved to be the part of his approach that drew the

40. Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products Footnote,
46 S. TEx. L. REv. 163, 166-67 (2004).
41.

ELY, supra note 1, at 103.

42.

Id. at 77.

43.

Id. at 152-53.
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most stinging criticism." Critiques notwithstanding, however, his principle
of representation reinforcement took its place in the constitutional canon.
B. Courts and the PoliticalPowerlessness Factor
1. DoctrinalEvolution in the Supreme Court

The ideas spawned by footnote four and Ely are embedded in the Supreme Court's equal protection doctrine. 45 The idea of a group's "political
powerlessness" appears among the multiple factors identified by the Court
as relevant to the determination of whether to apply heightened scrutiny.
There has been some variability in how the doctrinal test for heightened
scrutiny has been articulated and applied over time, and a majority of the
Court has never squarely said that a finding of political powerlessness is an
absolute sine qua non for heightening scrutiny, but the "traditional indicia of
suspectness" are regularly said to include whether the affected class is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process."46 On occasion, the Court has suggested that the class-based "disability" that has saddled members of the group must be based on "obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete
group."4 7
Although African Americans are often regarded as the paradigmatic
41
footnote four group, the application of strict scrutiny to race in foundational cases like McLaughlin v. Florida(1964) and Loving v. Virginia (1967)

did not, in fact, employ the political process rationale or refer to the foot-

44.

See, e.g., Ortiz, supra note 9, at 721-22; Tribe, supra note 7.

45. At a high level of generality, the theory of representation reinforcement proceeds from
the assumption that structural defects in the political process justify greater judicial solicitude. For
accounts considering the relevance of representational safeguards beyond the realm of equal protection, see, for example, Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485 (1994);
Gregory P. Magarian, The Jurisprudenceof Colliding FirstAmendment Limits: From the Dead End
of Neutrality to the Open Road of Participation-EnhancingReview, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 185
(2007).
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); see ERWIN CHEMER672 (3d ed. 2006) (stating that courts
determine the applicable level of scrutiny based on "immutable characteristics," "the ability of the
group to protect itself through the political process," the "history of discrimination against the
group," and the "likelihood that the classification reflects prejudice as opposed to a permissible
governing purpose").
46.

INSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIEs

47. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635,
638 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court has not made immutability a strict requirement. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protectionfor Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915, 923-32 (1989).
48.

See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
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note.4 9 Those cases instead stressed the unique history and odiousness of
racial classifications. 0 As a matter of post hoc characterization, the Court
has on occasion suggested a political process justification for the treatment
of race under equal protection. In its 1976 decision in Mathews v. Lucas, for
example, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny to a law that disadvantaged
nonmarital children, 5 1 relying principally on the history of discrimination
against such children and the immutability of the characteristic. In declining
to ratchet up further the level of scrutiny, however, the majority alluded to
process theory, asserting that "this discrimination against illegitimates has
never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discriminationagainst women and Negroes."52
In fact, the first time the Court expressly linked the application of strict
scrutiny to footnote four's language about discrete and insular minorities
came in Graham v. Richardson, a 1971 decision in which the Court struck
down laws conditioning welfare benefits on U.S. citizenship and called
aliens "a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom such
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." In later cases, the Court characterized its jurisprudence about alienage as "treat[ing] certain restrictions
on aliens with 'heightened judicial solicitude,' a treatment deemed necessary
since aliens-pending their eligibility for citizenship-have no direct voice
in the political processes."54 Aliens, of course, present a distinctively strong
case because their inability to vote presents an explicit case of political
powerlessness, at least to the extent that political power is equated with voting. In light of Graham, the Court going forward might have narrowed its
focus to instances of literal disenfranchisement. As framed by Ely and footnote four, however, such disenfranchisement had never been required, and
later cases did not newly narrow the idea of political powerlessness in this
way.
Two years after Graham, Justice Brennan offered a relatively sustained
analysis of the political powerlessness idea in his 1973 plurality opinion in
Frontiero v. Richardson, in which four justices were ready to apply strict
scrutiny in cases involving gender classifications." In that plurality, Justice
49. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). This
point is nicely developed in EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 40-42 (1999).
50. Similarly, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), did not focus on level of
scrutiny or process theory at all.
51.

Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).

52.

Id. at 506 (emphasis added).

53.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citation omitted). For a history of
when and how courts have used the footnote, see Gilman, supra note 40.
54.
See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978) (citations omitted) (citing Graham, 403 U.S. at 372, and United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). In
Foley and in other alienage cases, the Court carved out a "political functions" exemption that, notwithstanding the application of strict scrutiny, permitted the exclusion of aliens from certain kinds of
programs in which citizenship could legitimately be required. See, e.g., id. at 294-95.
55.

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
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Brennan noted that women had long suffered discrimination, "perhaps most
conspicuously, in the political arena." 6 Brennan's opinion acknowledged
that women did not constitute a minority, but countered by detailing and
emphasizing the underrepresentation of women in the "Nation's decisionmaking councils."" The opinion went on to note that Congress had enacted
multiple statutory protections based on gender and had approved the Equal
Rights Amendment. As we will see in tracing political powerlessness doctrine, the very fact that Congress had enacted measures to combat gender
discrimination might have posed an obstacle to finding that women lacked
meaningful political power. Far from seeing any tension between the
underrepresentation of women in the legislative branch and the ability to
secure some legislative relief, however, Brennan instead cited these legislative measures in support of raising judicial scrutiny. His justification was
that "Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are
inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is not without significance to the question presently under
consideration."
At the time of Graham and Frontiero,it was still an open question how
long a list of suspect or quasi-suspect classifications the Court might
permit. While the Court later settled on intermediate scrutiny for gender in
Craig v. Boren, 9 its opinion in Craig, unlike the Brennan plurality in
Frontiero,did not engage political process theory. And the Court declined
other opportunities to extend heightened scrutiny to further classifications.
For example, the Court is understood to have declined to heighten scrutiny
based on poverty in San Antonio Independent School District v.

Rodriguez,6 notwithstanding that poor people might be regarded as
exemplifying the very essence of political powerlessness. To some degree,
the facts of Rodriguez, a challenge to a Texas school-finance plan, allowed
the Court to dodge the central question of the utter political
marginalization of the poor. Because of the way the finance plan worked,
it arguably did not reflect a clear classification based on wealth. Still, the
broad language the Court used in disposing of the level-of-scrutiny issue
has been widely regarded as rejecting heightened scrutiny based on
62
poverty. Ironically, because of its factual quirks, the Rodriguez majority
opinion did not itself analyze the powerlessness issue, even though it has
become the leading citation for the idea that judicial skepticism should
56.

Id. at 686.

57.

Id. at 686 n.17.

58.

Id. at 687-88.

59.

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).

60.

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 (1973).

61.

Id. at 22-23.

62. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 46, at 786 (citing Rodriguez for the proposition that the
Court "held that discrimination against the poor does not warrant heightened scrutiny" but noting
that the Court "also rejected the claim that the [Texas] law should be regarded as discriminating
against the poor as a group").
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increase when a group has been "relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process."63 A few years after Rodriguez,
Massachusetts Retirement Board v. Murgia rejected heightened scrutiny
for age.6 The Court emphasized the universality of aging:
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state police officers over the age of 50.
It cannot be said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it draws
the line at a certain age in middle life. But even old age does not define a
"discrete and insular" group, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938), in need of "extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process." Instead, it marks a stage that each of us
will reach if we live out our normal span. Even if the statute could be said
to impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it would not impose a

distinction sufficiently akin to those classifications that we have found
61
suspect to call for strict judicial scrutiny.
In the mid-1980s, the Court likewise declined to heighten scrutiny for
mental retardation, at least as a nominal matter. In City of Cleburne, Texas v.
Cleburne Learning Center, the Court ruled that rational basis was the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to a local ordinance that disadvantaged
people with mental retardation. 6 Departing from the language of Frontiero,
which had suggested that the extension of antidiscrimination legislation to a
group might, in fact, strengthen the case for heightened scrutiny, the Court
noted that rational basis review was appropriate, in part, because advocates
for the mentally retarded had been able to "attract the attention of . .. law67
makers" and secure some protective legislation. In that case, process theory
functioned as a reason to ratchet down the level of scrutiny. On the other
hand, Cleburne is well known for employing an unusually demanding form
of rationality review that invalidated the challenged ordinance, suggesting
that the Court was not as willing as it ordinarily is on rationality review to
defer to the operation of a well-functioning political process.
As Rodriguez, Murgia, and Cleburne reflect, the Burger Court signaled
its reluctance to extend heightened scrutiny to further classifications. Other
than deciding to apply intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on birth
outside wedlock," the Court consistently declined the opportunities
63.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.

64.

Mass. Ret. Bd. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).

65.

Id. at 313-14.

66.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).

67. Id. at 445. There were other factors cited that were not relevant to political process theory. For example, the Court said that heightened judicial skepticism would be appropriate because it
was sometimes sensible for government to treat people with retardation differently than those without it. See id. at 444-45.
68. After some inconsistent decisions, the Court applied a form of intermediate scrutiny in
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), and Lalli v. Lali, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). A few years later,
the Court explicitly erased any doubt about standard of review that might have lingered. See Clark v.
Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).

Michigan Law Review

1376

IVol. 109: 1363

presented to it. Thus, when all was said and done, before deciding the major
contemporary gay rights cases, the Court had settled on strict scrutiny for
race, national origin, and alienage (with the latter subject to exceptions);
intermediate scrutiny for gender and birth outside marriage; and rational
basis--of some sort-for poverty, mental disability, and age.
In the course of making political powerlessness an element of equal protection doctrine, the justices have had very little to say about what the idea
of political powerlessness means and requires, and even less to say about the
underlying idea of democracy informing the Court's assessment of the political process. Supreme Court opinions simply contain very little by way of
exposition. Nevertheless, a few points can be distilled.
First, various members of the Court have expressly linked the idea of
political powerlessness to the language of footnote four, thus at least confirming that the intellectual blueprint for the doctrinal element of
powerlessness is the idea that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" can cause a political malfunction warranting close judicial scrutiny.
This linkage, however, operates at a high level of generality, for the Court,
in turn, has not said much about what constitutes either the "prejudice,"
"discreteness," or "insularity" contemplated by the footnote.70
Second, over time, the Court has considered how much weight should be
given a group's numerical status in the population, but no clear principle has
emerged. Several opinions suggest that mathematical majority status does
not preclude a finding of political powerlessness. For example, as noted earlier, the Court has accorded heightened scrutiny to women, notwithstanding
the fact that women comprise a numerical majority, on occasion citing factors like the underrepresentation of women in elected office. 7' Justice Scalia
has objected to this as inconsistent with footnote four, but has not prevailed. Similarly, the justices have extended strict scrutiny to the context of
affirmative action. To the extent that a finding of political powerlessness is
thought to be required to support heightened scrutiny, this heightening of
scrutiny is puzzling because it suggests-implicitly, but improbably-that
aggrieved whites meet the test of political powerlessness. This line of cases
raises the question whether the Court is and should be focusing on suspect
classes (as suggested by the powerlessness factor) or suspect classifications
69. This is done in different ways and doctrinal contexts. See United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 575-76 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 317
n. 10 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing footnote four and Ely); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484-87 (1982); O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 801 n.8
(1980) (citing footnote four); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) (citing footnote four).
70. On occasion the Court's reasoning has suggested that "discrete and insular," or "subject
to prejudice," is a term of art. In O'Bannon, 447 U.S. at 786-90, for example, the Court held that
nursing home residents disadvantaged by certain rules might be a minority and victims of physical
infirmity and neglect, but were not objects of footnote four-type prejudice.
71.

See supra Section I.B.1,

72.

See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

73. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 553-55 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387-402 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part).
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(as suggested by the affirmative action cases).74 In some instances, though, it
has been contested whether it is accurate to treat whites as the numerical
majority. For example, in dueling opinions in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., the majority and dissent debated the relevance of the fact that
African Americans held a majority on the city council that enacted an affirmative action program for city contractors.7 The majority noted that "one
aspect of the judiciary's role under the Equal Protection Clause is to protect
'discrete and insular minorities' from majoritarian prejudice or indifference,"7 and argued that this protective judicial function was appropriate in
that case because:
[B]lacks constitute approximately 50% of the population of the city of
Richmond. Five of the nine seats on the city council are held by blacks.
The concern that a political majority will more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based on unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts
would seem to militate for, not against, the application of heightened judicial scrutiny in this case."
Justice Marshall's dissent, by contrast, argued that "this Court has never
held that numerical inferiority, standing alone, makes a racial group 'suspect' "; that "[i]t cannot seriously be suggested that nonminorities in
Richmond have any 'history of purposeful unequal treatment' "; and that
"the numerical and political dominance of nonminorities within the State of
Virginia and the Nation as a whole provides an enormous political check
against the 'simple racial politics' at the municipal level which the majority
fears." 78
Finally, as alluded to earlier, the Court has briefly considered on a few
occasions whether the fact that a group has achieved some legislative success should bar a finding of political powerlessness. Recall the contrast
between the Frontiero plurality (suggesting that the achievement of such
protective legislation does not preclude a finding of political powerlessness)
and Cleburne (suggesting that such legislation can exercise some preclusive
effect). 9 But the Court has not been consistent or categorical on this point,
nor has it probed the issue in any systematic way.

74.

See GERSTMANN, supra note 49.

75.

Compare J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 495-96, with id. at 553-55 (Marshall, J., dissent-

76.

Id. at 495 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)).

77.

Id. at 495-96.

ing).

78. Id. at 553-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
79. Cf Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) (declining to find conscientious
objectors to be a suspect classification, citing the fact that Congress chose to recognize a conscientious-objectors exemption for military training, and suggesting that conscientious objectors were not
politically powerless).
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2. Sexual Orientationand PoliticalPowerlessness
in Supreme Court Opinions

The Supreme Court has never squarely framed and analyzed whether
sexual orientation classifications should be subject to heightened scrutiny,
nor has a majority of the Court analyzed the political power of LGBT people as that power may be relevant to equal protection doctrine. The clearest
opportunity for the Court to have done so was the 1996 decision in Romer v.
Evans, striking down Colorado's Amendment 2, a ballot initiative that
would have wiped out, and preemptively banned the future enactment of,
antidiscrimination protections for gay, lesbian, and bisexual people.so The
case presented the opportunity to apply standard political powerlessness
analysis, as well as a specialized doctrine, associated with Hunter v. Erickson, 8 that closely scrutinizes acts of "political restructuring" that adversely
affect minority groups by relegating certain policy questions to the realm of
statewide direct democracy.82 The state supreme court had relied on the
Hunter doctrine in striking down Amendment 2."' Many of the briefs in the
case addressed the Hunter theory, but that argument was explicitly set aside
84
by the high Court without comment. Likewise, though the Court had been
asked by amici in the case to make sexual orientation a suspect or quasisuspect classification, it also declined to address that question. In striking
down the Colorado measure, the Court applied a version of rationality review that was, as in Cleburne, far from the standard rubber stamp. Most
pertinent for our purposes, while the Court stressed the centrality of anti-gay
animus in its analysis, the opinion did not discuss the relevant level of scrutiny. Proceeding in this fashion enabled the majority to remain silent on the
political powerlessness issue as it concerned LGBT people.
On other occasions, the Supreme Court has been presented with arguments in favor of heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation, including
claims grounded in process theory. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court upheld
86
the constitutionality of Georgia's ban on sodomy. The Court decided the
case on substantive due process grounds, though political power arguments87
in favor of heightened scrutiny were also made to the Court by amici.
80.

517 U.S. 620 (1996).

81.

393 U.S. 385 (1969).

82. See Stephen M. Rich, Note, Ruling by Numbers: PoliticalRestructuring and the Reconsideration of DemocraticCommitments After Romer v. Evans, 109 YALE L.J. 587 (1999).
83. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 513 U.S. 1146 (1995),
aff'd, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
84. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 626 ("We ... now affirm the judgment, but on a rationale different from that adopted by the State Supreme Court.").
85. See, e.g., Brief of the Human Rights Campaign Fund et al., as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents, Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (No. 94-1039), 1995 WL 17008436.
86.

478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

87. See Brief of the National Organization for Women as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140), 1986 WL 720446 (citing footnote four); cf Amicus
Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Respondents by Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund et al.,
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When the Court reversed Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas, it once again ruled
on due process grounds, but Justice O'Connor would have struck down the
Texas ban on same-sex sodomy as a matter of equal protection," and the
Court was again asked by amici to raise the level of scrutiny."
Notwithstanding the Court's choice to avoid directly engaging the issue
of LGBT political power, individual justices have opined on the question.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence suggested that political process themes that have shaped the application of heightened scrutiny might
likewise have a role to play in what some have called heightened rational
basis. 0 She noted that rational basis cases ordinarily involve judicial deference to the political process because of the assumption that "even
improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes."9 In the case of a sodomy law applying only to same-sex partners,
however, she suggested that a "bare desire to harm the group" might be all
that the state could plausibly marshal to defend the law,9 2 thus necessitating
a "more searching form of rational basis review."93 If a law like the Texas
provision applied equally to heterosexuals, she suggested, it "would not
long stand in our democratic society."9 4 Its targeted imposition of a stigma,
she argued, blunted those political safeguards and "threaten[ed] the creation
of an underclass." 95
Years earlier, Justice Brennan dissented from the denial of certiorari in a
case involving a guidance counselor terminated based on her sexual orientation. In his opinion, he argued that:
[H]omosexuals constitute a significant and insular minority of this country's population. Because of the immediate and severe opprobrium often
manifested against homosexuals once so identified publicly, members of
this group are particularly powerless to pursue their rights openly in the
political arena. Moreover, homosexuals have historically been the object of
pernicious and sustained hostility, and it is fair to say that discrimination

Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140), 1986 WL 720449 (citing process theory as part of substantive
due process analysis).
88.

539 U.S. 558, 579-85 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

89. See Brief of the National Lesbian and Gay Law Association, et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152348.
90. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also
supra note 46, at 844-46.

CHEMERINSKY,

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting City of Cleburne v.
91.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92.

Id. at 582.

93.

Id. at 580.

94.

Id. at 584-85.

95. Id. at 584 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1009 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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against homosexuals is "likely ... to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather
than ... rationality."9
The most extended arguments in a recent Supreme Court opinion about
LGBT political power, however, appear in a very different context-Justice
Scalia's dissent in Romer. Scalia was, in a word, scathing about the idea that
gay people might be thought to lack political power, calling it:
[N]othing short of preposterous to call "politically unpopular" a group
which enjoys enormous influence in American media and politics, and
which, as the trial court here noted, though composing no more than 4% of
the population had the support of 46% of the voters on Amendment 2.9
In more measured prose, the Colorado state trial court judge in Romer,
who had denied heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation, similarly noted
the percentage of voters who were against Amendment 2, as well as the fact
that an increasing number of states and localities had enacted measures
shielding gay people from discrimination." Scalia, however, went further
and argued that gay people had not a deficit, but a surfeit, of political power.
He asserted that gay people have not only "high disposable income," but
"political power much greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide."'" "Quite understandably," he went on, "they devote this political
power to achieving not merely a grudging social toleration, but full social
acceptance, of homosexuality."'o' The premise that local concentrations of
gay people were able to wield outsize political power became central to Scalia's defense of the Colorado constitutional amendment struck down by the
majority:
That is where Amendment 2 came in. It sought to counter both the geographic concentration and the disproportionate political power of
homosexuals by (1) resolving the controversy at the statewide level and
(2) making the election a single-issue contest for both sides. It put directly,
to all the citizens of the State, the question: Should homosexuality be given

97. Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1014 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting Plyler,
457 U.S. at 216 n.14).
98.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

99. See GERSTMANN, supra note 49, at 80 (quoting Judge Bayless's opinion in C-18 of Colorado's petition for certiorari). Six years before Romer, the Ninth Circuit had rejected the idea of
strict scrutiny for gay people in a case involving a challenge to a Department of Defense policy of
conducting enhanced security checks on gay and lesbian job applicants. See High Tech Gays v. Def.
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 E2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990). In doing so, the court cited Cleburne and
foreshadowed the idea that a group's ability to secure antidiscrimination legislation ought to preclude a finding of political powerlessness. Id. at 574. Citing the political powerlessness criterion, the
Circuit Court concluded that "legislatures have addressed and continue to address the discrimination
suffered by homosexuals on account of their sexual orientation through passage of antidiscrimination legislation. Thus, homosexuals are not without political power; they have the ability to and do
attract the attention of the lawmakers as evidenced by such legislation." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also GERSTMANN, supra note 49, at 81.

100.

Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

101. Id. at 646 (characterizing gay rights efforts as the "homosexuals' quest for social endorsement").
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special protection? They answered no. The Court today asserts that this
most democratic of procedures is unconstitutional.'0
Scalia's claims have come in for empirical critique,'0 o but he has apparently
not backed off his view of gay people as a powerful force with which to be
reckoned.'"
3. Same-Sex MarriageCases in State Supreme Courts

State courts ruling in favor of marriage equality have been all over the
map in terms of level of scrutiny. Of the seven that have ruled in favor of
same-sex couples, two (Hawaii and California) applied strict scrutiny,' 5 two
(Connecticut and Iowa) applied intermediate scrutiny,'0 one (Massachusetts)
applied rational basis,' 7 one (New Jersey) applied a distinctive state law
hybrid standard,'o and the final state (Vermont) interpreted its "common
benefits clause" in a way that does not readily map onto tiers of scrutiny.
Each of the three states rejecting the same-sex couples' claims (Maryland,
New York, and Washington) employed rational basis."o
Several of these opinions, on both sides of the question, address the issue whether gays and lesbians are politically powerless as that term has
been used in equal protection case law."' The question on which the opinions most sharply disagree is what we might call the preclusion thesis: when
a group shows itself able to secure some legislative or other policy victories,
or to elect some of its members to office, a finding of political powerlessness is precluded.

102.

Id. at 647.

103.

M.V.

LEE BADGETT, INCOME INFLATION: THE MYTH OF AFFLUENCE AMONG GAY, LES-

4 (1998), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/
reports/reports/IncomelnflationMyth.pdf.
BIAN, AND BISEXUAL AMERICANS

104. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
fact that Texas was one of few states with a sodomy law reflected gay political success, and asserting that the legal profession had embraced the homosexual "agenda").
105. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401, 441-42, 444, 446 (Cal. 2008), superseded by
constitutional amendment, California Marriage Protection Act, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw.),
reconsiderationgranted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993), appeal after remand sub nom., Baehr v.
Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), and order aff'd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997).
106. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412, 432, 476 (Conn. 2008); Varnum
v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 895 (Iowa 2009).
107.

Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003).

108.

Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 212 (N.J. 2006).

109.

Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).

110. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 605-06 (Md. 2007); Hernandez v. Robles, 885 N.E.2d
1, 12 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 969 (Wash. 2006).
Ill. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional
amendment, California Marriage Protection Act, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss
v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 440-44; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 893-95;
Conaway, 932 A.2d at 609-14; Andersen, 138 P.3d at 974-75.
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In rejecting the state constitutional claims of same-sex couples, the
Washington and Maryland courts seemed to embrace a version of the preclusion thesis. Both opinions cited legislative victories as disqualifying for
purposes of satisfying the political powerlessness criterion. The Maryland
court emphasized that "at least in Maryland, advocacy to eliminate discrimination against gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons based on their sexual
orientation has met with growing successes in the legislative and executive
branches of government,"" 2 and listed a series of statutes reflecting these
victories." The Washington court similarly enumerated gay legislative successes on the state and municipal levels as an argument against heightening
scrutiny."4 These courts likewise cited other measures of contemporary political power, such as the election of openly gay candidates (Washington),"'
and the general "political coming of age" of the organized gay rights movement (Maryland).'
By contrast, the Connecticut, Iowa, and New Jersey opinions, as well as
dissenting opinions in other states, took issue with the preclusion thesis."'
The California court, for example, contested the temporal premise of the
thesis, arguing at some length that historical-not contemporary-political
powerlessness is the appropriate frame of reference."' The New Jersey court
took a different tack, arguing that the analysis ought to be issue-specific, and
noting that success in giving individuals some statutory protections against
certain forms of discrimination had not prevented continuing discrimination

112.

Conaway, 932 A.2d at 611.

113. The court listed statutes banning sexual orientation-based discrimination covering public
accommodations, employment, housing, and education. Id. at 611-12.
114.

Andersen, 138 P.3d at 974.

115.

Id.

116.

Conaway, 932 A.2d at 613.

117. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 444 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien,
763 N.W.2d 862, 896 (Iowa 2009); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 199 (N.J. 2006).
118.

In relevant part, the majority opinion asserted:

Although some California decisions in discussing suspect classifications have referred to a
group's political powerlessness, our cases have not identified a group's current political powerlessness as a necessary prerequisite for treatment as a suspect class. Indeed, if a group's
current political powerlessness were a prerequisite to a characteristic's being considered a
constitutionally suspect basis for differential treatment, it would be impossible to justify the
numerous decisions that continue to treat sex, race, and religion as suspect classifications. Instead, our decisions make clear that the most important factors in deciding whether a
characteristic should be considered a constitutionatly suspect basis for classification are
whether the class of persons who exhibit a certain characteristic historically has been subjected
to invidious and prejudicial treatment, and whether society now recognizes that the characteristic in question generally bears no relationship to the individual's ability to perform or
contribute to society. Thus, courts must look closely at classifications based on that characteristic lest outdated social stereotypes result in invidious laws or practices. This rationale clearly
applies to statutory classifications that mandate differential treatment on the basis of sexual
orientation.
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment,
California Marriage Protection Act, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton,
207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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against same-sex couples."' The Connecticut Supreme Court's analysis was
the most developed and extended. Its majority characterized the historic
discrimination against gay people as "pervasive and severe," and then cited
evidence of continuing hate crimes and negative sentiment toward gay people in public opinion polls to contest any idea that anti-gay discrimination
was a thing of the past.120 In light of the deep-seated animosity toward gay
and lesbian people, the Court reasoned, the question is not whether gay people have been able to win some legislative protections against continuing
discrimination or elect a relatively small number of openly gay candidates.121
Instead, the Court said the inquiry should be:
[W]hether the group lacks sufficient political strength to bring a prompt
end to the prejudice and discrimination through traditional political means.
Consequently, a group satisfies the political powerlessness factor if it demonstrates that, because of the pervasive and sustained nature of the
discrimination that its members have suffered, there is a risk that that discrimination will not be rectified, sooner rather than later, merely by resort
to the democratic process.m
Note that the Connecticut court expressly changed the frame of reference from the enactment to the likely effects of antidiscrimination statutes.
The Iowa court relied heavily on this approach in its own decision. 12 These
courts thus emphasize the historical context that generated antidiscrimination legislation, rather than the fact of enactment alone.
4. The Prop. 8 Trial: The Experts Face Off
The state court decisions reviewed above probe and elaborate the meaning of the political powerlessness criterion more extensively than the
Supreme Court. But their depth of analysis is, in turn, widely exceeded by
the extended trial testimony on this point in the Perry v. Schwarzenegger
litigation challenging Prop. 8. The combined testimony of political scientists
Gary Segura and Kenneth Miller consumed many hours and hundreds of
transcript pages.

119.

The New Jersey court stated:

The statutory and decisional laws of this State protect individuals from discrimination
based on sexual orientation. When those individuals are gays and lesbians who follow the inclination of their sexual orientation and enter into a committed relationship with someone of
the same sex, our laws treat them, as couples, differently than heterosexual couples. As committed same-sex partners, they are not permitted to marry or to enjoy the multitude of social
and financial benefits and privileges conferred on opposite-sex married couples.
Lewis, 908 A.2d at 200.
120.

Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 444.

121.

Id. at 446.

122.

Id. at 444.

123.

See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896 (Iowa 2009).
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a. Testimony of Gary Segura
Segura identified several factors that he thought evidenced the inability
of gays and lesbians to protect themselves in the political process. He summarized his opinion as follows:
My opinion is that when we take together the moments of legislative
victory, the moments of legislative defeat, the presence of ballot initiatives,
the absence of statutory or constitutional protection, the presence of statutory or constitutional disadvantage, and a host of circumstances, including
small numbers, public hostility, hostility of elected officials, and a clearly
well-integrated, nationally prominent, organized opposition, I conclude
that gays and lesbians lack the sufficient power necessary to protect themselves in the political system.14
He stressed several themes in his testimony. First, he argued that gay
men and lesbians lack the numbers to be effective advocates in a political
arena dominated by heterosexual norms.125 Second, and relatedly, he suggested that gay men and lesbians are at a particular disadvantage in direct
democracy because they do not constitute a sufficient portion of the population "in any jurisdiction of any size to shape outcomes." 2 6 Noting that
"[t]here is no group in American society who has been targeted by ballot
initiatives more than gays and lesbians," he emphasized that the group has
essentially lost 100 percent of ballot initiatives on same-sex marriage, and
has lost 70 percent of contests over other matters (including Amendment 2,
struck down in Romer).127 Segura also suggested that the initiative process
tends to "nationalize issues," by enmeshing state legal questions in a broader
"culture war" in ways that mobilize political opponents and activate formidable oppositional resources.128 And he testified that ballot initiatives have
frequently overturned legislative gains made by. LGBT advocates, compelling members of the community to refight the same battles, requiring them
to expend enormous resources without making much progress, and
"chill[ing] legislatures" by dissuading them from pursuing legislative remedies for discrimination that may spark voter reversal.12 9
Third, Segura emphasized the array of formidable political obstacles
confronting LGBT rights advocates. In addition to the community's small
size and the well-organized and well-funded national opposition to same-sex
marriage, Segura identified several other relevant forces. One is the relatively low scores achieved by gay men and lesbians on "feeling
124.

Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 21, at 1646.

125. Id. at 1560; see also id. at 1556-57, 1582-83, 1660, 1709, 1721. In this connection,
Segura also mentioned the devastating impact HIV/AIDS has had on the gay community, noting that
it reduced the gay population and shifted political resources to public health and prevention efforts.
Id. at 1583-84, 1819.
126.

Id. at 1560.

127.

Id. at 1552.

128.

Id. at 1552-53.

129.

Id. at 1556.
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thermometer[s]," which are used by political scientists to capture public sentiment by asking "[o]n a scale from zero to 100, how warmly do you feel
about [group Xl."o Gay men and lesbians received a mean score of 49.4, in
comparison to scores somewhere between 65 and 69 for religious and racial
minorities subjected to historical discrimination.' Segura thought these
numbers evidenced "profound" prejudice that permeates the political
process and severely disadvantages gay men and lesbians in the "pluralist
... contest of ideas."3 2 In Segura's words, "It's very difficult to engage in
the give-and-take of the legislative process when I [or a majority of a legislator's constituents] think you are an inherently bad person."' 3 Segura
emphasized the rising numbers of anti-gay hate crimes, noting an increase
in violence directed at gay men and lesbians between 2003 and 2008, with
a "substantial" jump in 2007.'3 He also testified that hate crimes targeting
LGBT people are making up an increasingly larger share of total hate
crimes. " Disapproval and the threat of violence, Segura suggested, undermines political power by encouraging gays and lesbians to remain
"invisible."' 3 6
Another obstacle that Segura identified is the lack of "descriptive representation"-that is, the underrepresentation of gays and lesbians in political
office."' Segura saw the meager numbers of openly gay officials in a range
of settings as having two main consequences: first, requiring the LGBT
movement to rely heavily on the support and steadfastness of allies;"" and
second, leaving legislators, in the absence of gay colleagues, free to engage
in "thoughtless or disparaging behavior... [I]n many parts of the country
elected officials have absolutely no problem speaking about gays and lesbians in a way that you could not imagine them speaking about any other
member of the electorate." " Segura argued that political discourse of this
kind works to communicate the acceptability of discriminatory treatment. 40
Finally, Segura addressed head-on what I have called the preclusion thesis. Acknowledging some gains in the areas of antidiscrimination and antihate crime legislation, he nevertheless likened the argument that passage of
130.

Id. at 1562.

131.

Id. at 1563-64.

132.

Id. at 1560.

133.

Id. at 1561.

134.

Id. at 1569.

135.

Id.

136.

Id. at 1574.

137. Id. at 1556-57. Along these lines, only six openly gay individuals have ever served in the
House of Representatives, and only two of those were openly gay when elected. No openly gay
individuals have ever served in the Senate, Cabinet, or Presidency. Only about I percent of state
legislators nationwide are openly gay, and this number is far lower among local government officials
(estimated at .05 percent). Id.
138.

Id. at 1582, 1660.

139.

Id. at 1558-59.

140.

Id. at 1560.
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antidiscrimination legislation demonstrates political power to the notion that
that the more prescription medications a person takes, the healthier that patient must be.' 4' He also emphasized that statutory protections have been
vulnerable to repeal by hostile legislators and by ballot measures. 14 And he
noted that twenty-nine states still offer no statutory protection at all against
discrimination based on sexual orientation,14 nor does federal antidiscrimination legislation cover sexual orientation.'" Beyond this gap in federal
coverage, moreover, Segura noted that significant federal statutes, in fact,
affirmatively discriminate based on sexual orientation, such as the Defense
of Marriage Act ("DOMA") and the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy.14 Segura compared the current level of gay and lesbian political power
with that of women in the 1970s, and African Americans in the 1960s.'" He
argued that, in some respects, gay men and lesbians as a group are worse off
now than both of those groups were at the time heightened scrutiny was extended to them, because gay men and lesbians today have fewer statutory
protections and lower descriptive representation than the other groups had at
comparable periods.147 Segura also noted that, "as a constitutional matter,
gays and lesbians are moving in the opposite direction than African Americans were in the 1940s."148 He pointed to the fact that "in 1990, there was
not a single constitutional establishment of inequality for gays and lesbians,
and today there are-in about three-fifths of the states, there is constitutionally-established inequality." 49

141.

Id. at 1548-49.

142.

Id. at 1548-50.

143.

Id. at 1655.

144. Id. at 1546. The only protection in federal statutory law is the recent addition of sexual
orientation to law banning hate crimes. See Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes
Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 249 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2010).
145. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 21, at 1581. Two significant developments took
place several months after Segura testified. First, Congress passed and the President signed a bill
authorizing the repeal of the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, once certain certifications are made by
military officials and the President. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Away 'Don't Ask, Don't
Tell', N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/us/politics/23military.html.
Second, as this Article was being completed, the Department of Justice announced that, in circuits
that had not already determined that rational basis review is the correct level of scrutiny to apply to
sexual orientation-based claims, it would no longer defend the portion of DOMA that bars the federal government from providing benefits to couples legally married under state law. The Department
reasoned that the law could not survive the heightened scrutiny it believed appropriate for sexual
orientation-based classifications. Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Turnabout, U.S. Says
MarriageAct Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at Al.
146.

Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 21, at 1647-52.

147.

Id.

148.

Id. at 1650.

149.

Id.

Ely at the Altar

June 2011]1

1387

b. Testimony of Kenneth Miller

Testifying on behalf of those defending Prop. 8, Professor Kenneth Miller identified five key determinants of political power: money, access to
lawmakers, size and cohesion of a group, the ability to attract allies and
form coalitions, and the ability to persuade. Citing language from the Supreme Court's decision in Cleburne, Miller concluded that gay men and
lesbians are not politically powerless because they "have the ability to attract the attention of lawmakers."'50
In unpacking his conclusion, Miller identified money as "a critical asset
for achieving political power," suggesting that the ability of the "No-onProp.-8" campaign to raise more than forty-three million dollars signified a
"striking" degree of power."' He noted that no other social issue voted on by
ballot initiative ever involved that that much money.15
Miller also testified at some length about the political support LGBT
rights advocates have had in California, both in the unsuccessful campaign
to defeat Prop. 8 and in other battles. He identified a wide array of powerful
allies, including powerful legislators, unions, corporations, figures on the
entertainment industry, academics, various professional associations, and
members of the Bar.
Miller also counted among indicia of political power the ability of gay
and lesbian political groups to elect candidates of choice. 154 He noted, for
example, that in the last statewide election, Californians elected 95 percent
of the candidates endorsed by Equality California's Political Action Committee (fifty-nine out of sixty-two candidates)."" Additionally, legislators
suffered "no political price" for their legislative votes supporting same-sex
marriage, as all twenty-three incumbents who supported same-sex marriage
ran for reelection and won.156 And, on the related issue of descriptive representation, he testified that California was the first state to have an official
caucus for openly LGBT state legislators. 5 1 Miller also emphasized what he
saw as the "trajectory of increasing success" of openly gay politicians on a
national level.'58

In contrast to Segura, Miller pressed the preclusion thesis. He noted
that gay men and lesbians have attained "over 50 legislative victories" in
the California state legislature on hate crime laws; laws prohibiting sexual
150.

Id. at 2486-87.

151.

Id. at 2437-38.

152.

Id. at 2438-39.

153.

Id. at 2447-68.

154.

Id. at 2470.

155.

Id. at 2470-71.

156.

Id. at 2471.

Id. at 2453.
158. Relying on data from the Gay and Lesbian Victory Fund, he noted that, in 2008, 80 out
of Ill openly LGBT candidates were elected to office, and at least 49 out of 79 were elected in
2009. Id. at 2480.
157.
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orientation discrimination in the areas of "employment, housing, public
education, and labor organizations, with respect to adoption, foster care,
public contracting, insurance, state-funded programs and business services";
and domestic partnership laws.' 59 Additionally, several municipalities have
passed domestic partnership ordinances.'6 Looking to the law in other
states, Miller noted that many have adopted hate crime legislation,16 or
some form of protection against employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation. He also emphasized that many local governments and major
corporations have taken steps to protect against employment discrimination
and, in some cases, to extend benefits to domestic partners.163
Miller rejected Segura's opinion that gay men and lesbians lacked political power at the national level, pointing to recent enactment of federal hate
crime legislation and rising levels of support in Congress to repeal "don't
ask, don't tell" and DOMA, and to enact the Employment Nondiscrimination Act and legislation providing some domestic partnership benefits.'
Along similar lines, Miller characterized President Obama and then-Speaker
Pelosi as powerful supporters of the LGBT community.
Miller sharply diverged from Segura on the issue of the initiative process. While acknowledging defeats on marriage in 2000 and 2008, Miller
insisted that "California voters have not used the initiative process, nor the
popular referendum, to repeal or limit the legislature's other broad expansions of LGBT rights."l66 He noted that, in fact, some ballot measures
adverse to LGBT interests had been defeated by voters in the 1970s and
1980s,'"' and that there had been no initiative to repeal the statewide domestic partnership law.
Miller concluded by noting substantial improvements in public opinion
trends toward LGBT issues.169 He noted the substantial shift in support for
same-sex marriage from 2000, when the voters enacted Prop. 22 (the statutory predecessor of Prop. 8) by a margin of twenty-two points, to 2008 when
159.

Id. at 2472.

160.

Id. at 2473-74.

161.

Id. at 2478.

162.

Id.

163.

Id. at 2479.

164. Id. at 2482-83. Legislation setting in motion the process to repeal "don't ask, don't tell"
has since been enacted. See Stolberg, supra note 145.
165.

Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 21, at 2483-84.

166.

Id. at 2475.

167. He testified that, in 1978 voters rejected Proposition 6-which would have allowed
public schools to fire teachers and other personnel found to be advocating, imposing, encouraging or
promoting homosexual activity-by a "decisive" 58% "no" vote. Id. at 2475-76. Similarly, in the
1980s Californians rejected three measures that sought to make persons with HIV subject to quarantine and isolation, and require doctors to report suspected HIV carriers, all by very decisive margins
(between 65.6% and 71%). Id. at 2476-77.
168.

Id. at 2478.

169.

Id. at 2485.
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Prop. 8 passed by only four points."o In general, Miller viewed "the public
[as now] demonstrat[ing] increasing support for political objectives of
LGBT persons.""' Ending where he began, Miller reiterated that political
powerlessness means having "no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers."' Because gay men and lesbians had shown themselves able to
attract legislators' attention both in California and on the federal level, Miller's opinion was that the standard for demonstrating powerlessness could
not be satisfied. 7 3
c. The DistrictCourt'sAssessment of the Testimony
In his decision striking down Prop. 8, Judge Walker reviewed the dueling experts' testimony at length. 7 He characterized Segura's three opinions
in these terms: "(1) gays and lesbians do not possess a meaningful degree of
political power; (2) gays and lesbians possess less power than groups
granted judicial protection; and (3) the conclusions drawn by proponents'
expert Miller are troubling and unpersuasive."'7
As part of a blanket conclusion made about all nine expert witnesses offered by the plaintiffs, the judge found Segura to be "amply qualified" and
his opinions to be credible.'76 He later summarized Miller's conflicting opinion in these terms:
Miller testified that factors determining a group's political power include money, access to lawmakers, the size and cohesion of a group, the
ability to attract allies and form coalitions and the ability to persuade. Miller explained why, in his opinion, these factors favor a conclusion that gays
and lesbians have political power."
After reviewing the basis for Miller's opinion in detail, the judge determined that his testimony was "entitled to little weight and only to the extent

170. For the Prop. 22 voting results, see Statewide Election Results, CAL. SECRETARY ST.,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_elections.htm (follow "March 2000 Primary Election"
hyperlink; then follow "Summary of Votes on Statewide Measures" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 15,
2011). For the Prop. 8 voting results, see Statewide Election Results, CAL. SECRETARY ST.,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections-elections.htm (follow "November 2008 General Election"
hyperlink; then follow "Votes For and Against State Ballot Measures") (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
171.

Id.

172.

Id. at 2486-87.

173.

Id. at 2487.

174. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 943-44, 950-52, 986-91 (N.D. Cal.),
stay denied, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2010), stay granted, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug.
16, 2010), and certifying question to the Supreme Court of Cahifornia, 628 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir.
2011).
175.

Id. at 943.

176. Id. at 940 (concluding that all of the plaintiffs' nine expert witnesses were "amply qualifled to offer opinion testimony on the subjects identified"; had the appropriate "demeanor and
responsiveness"; and "offered credible opinion testimony"); see also id. at 943 (reviewing Segura's
testimony and credentials).
177.

Id. at 951 (citations omitted).
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[it is] amply supported by reliable evidence."' The opinion identified a
number of bases for the court's adverse credibility determination, including
the fact that Miller had not focused on gay and lesbian issues in his scholarship, had not read the works of many experts on gay political power, lacked
a basis for comparing gay political power to that of other groups, conceded
significant gaps in gay political power, and had taken positions contrary to
his testimony in prior scholarship." 9
While the judge explicitly credited Segura's testimony over Miller's,
he did not have occasion to parse the conflicts in their testimony in greater
detail, nor to resolve associated questions about the doctrinal meaning of
political powerlessness. On the issue as to which the evidence on gay political power was offered-heightened scrutiny-the judge summarily decided
that the prerequisites for finding gays and lesbians to be a suspect classification were met. 80 He also found, however, that Prop. 8 could not satisfy the
lesser demands of rational basis scrutiny.' Thus, notwithstanding the extended testimony on political power, heightened scrutiny did not figure
centrally in the district court's resolution of Prop. 8's constitutionality. Still,
the judge did make numerous references to the evidence offered by the political scientists as he assessed the substantive question whether Prop. 8 was
supported by any rational basis.18 As we will see in the concluding Section,
close analysis of the evidence introduced on the question of how the LGBT
community has fared in the political process suggests some ways in which
political process theory might be reconceived.
II. ASSESSING

PROCESS THEORY THROUGH THE LENS

OF THE MARRIAGE DEBATE

Having reviewed the disparate approaches taken by the experts in Perry
and by the various state marriage opinions, we are in a position to assess
what the same-sex marriage debate tells us about political process theory. I
want to press three interrelated points. First, process theory is tissue-thin. In
the absence of clearer substantive commitments about what makes a political process fair and how much/what kind of political power a group
"should" have, the theory offers little to resolve questions of application like
those raised in the marriage debate. Second, process theory is also thin in its
institutional assumptions. It makes reductive and stylized assumptions about
178.

Id. at 952.

179.

Id.

180. Id. at 997 ("[T]he evidence presented at trial shows that gays and lesbians are the type of
minority strict scrutiny was designed to protect.").
181. Id. ("The trial record shows that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review to
apply .. . . Here, however, strict scrutiny is unnecessary. Proposition 8 fails to survive even rational
basis review.").
182. Id. at 956, 960-61, 967, 982-83, 985-89. For discussion of how the court used the evidence on political power, see supra Section I.B.4.
183.

See infra Section It.A.
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courts and legislatures that do not stand up well to empirical scrutiny and
that distort the roles of legal institutions in social change. Third, process
theory does not live up to its animating aspiration to be meaningfully separate and distinct from substantive equality analysis itself. Dating to the work
of Tribe and others, critics of process theory have long stressed the theory's
inability to avoid substantive judgments." Analyzing the theory through the
lens of the marriage debate reveals new dimensions of this problem.
A. Missing Metrics, Missing Values

Let us begin with a fact that could easily be missed in the fog of hundreds of pages of transcript testimony given by the two trial experts.
Professors Segura and Miller came to diametrically opposite conclusions
about gay political power, but they did not dispute the underlying facts.
They disagreed profoundly about what inferences and conclusions legitimately followed from those facts, but not about the facts themselves.
Recall Miller's bottom line that "gays and lesbians have the ability to attract the attention of lawmakers in California.

. .

. [and] at the federal level,

as well,"' and contrast Segura's conclusion that "gays and lesbians lack the
sufficient power necessary to protect themselves in the political system." 8 6
The thematic fault line separating the experts' views matches some of the
divergence in the views of state supreme courts. The Maryland and Washington courts, for example, embraced the preclusion thesis and thought the
ability of gay rights advocates to secure passage of antidiscrimination legislation ought to bar a finding of political powerlessness,"' while the
Connecticut and Iowa courts focused, instead, on whether resorting to the
political process could be expected to bring a swift end to historical discrimination.8 As this juxtaposition makes clear, one camp emphasizes
access to the political process and the other stresses the limitations on what
that process can achieve in the face of entrenched discrimination.
This is no minor or marginal disagreement. The gap, instead, reflects the
use of fundamentally different metrics to assess political power. Significantly, the normative apparatus of process theory does not, itself, tell us
which metric is the correct one. In fact, the core postulates of process theory
are strikingly crude and underspecified. This is true whether process theory
finds expression in footnote four's "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities,'" Ely's representation reinforcement,"o the Supreme Court's
"political powerlessness" that "command[s] extraordinary protection from

184.

See supra notes 7, 9.

185.

Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 21, at 2487.

186.

Id. at 1646.

187.

See supra notes 112-116 and accompanying text.

188.

See supra notes 117-123 and accompanying text.

189.

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).

190.

ELY, supra note 1, at 101-04.
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the majoritarian political process,""' or some combination of them. It is difficult to extract from any of these formulations an operative concept of
political power that offers definitional guidance or identifies the criteria that
should be used to determine whether a group falls above or below the line
marking a political malfunction. 92
Beyond the conceptually different ways that the opposing experts and
state courts frame the political power inquiry, the same-sex marriage debate
presents two central issues as to which there is particularly sharp disagreement: the preclusion thesis (if the LGBT community can secure legislative
redress against discrimination, does that negate the possibility of a political
malfunction?) and the relevance of direct democracy (how does the frequent
use of direct democracy against LGBT interests factor into the analysis of
political power?). Here again, arguments can be-and have been-made on
either side of these issues in the vocabulary of process theory, but the initial
point I want to emphasize is that the internal logic of the approach does not
give us any singular way to arbitrate between these arguments.
The preclusion thesis, in particular, implicates a key baseline question.
Process theory essentially asks whether LGBT people-or other disadvantaged groups-have "sufficient" power to be left to their own political
devices, rather than receiving solicitous treatment from a court. Answering
this question depends not only on how political power is defined, but on
how sufficiency is understood. Therein lies the baseline question. To assess
meaningfully whether historical prejudice undermines a group's power, we,
presumably, need to know something about what the group's political power
would look like in a properly functioning political process.' In other words,
if Ely's distorting lens of prejudice had been removed or never been in
place, what would the undistorted, "natural" political process have produced
for gay people?
191.

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,28 (1973).

192. Nor is this conflict resolvable at the doctrinal level. It would overstate things by a considerable margin to regard the language in City of Cleburnev. CleburneLiving Ctr, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445
(1985), about the "ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers" as having settled the standard for
political powerlessness claims. The Supreme Court's pronouncements are far too scattered, scant, and
inconsistent to support that idea. Moreover, were the Cleburne language regarded as some kind of
definitive test, the heightened scrutiny accorded race and gender would be called sharply into question, given the demonstrated ability of racial minorities and women to "attract the attention of the
lawmakers." Id. In short, the doctrine remains undeveloped and uncertain because there are deeper
conceptual questions at work. For an argument that an overreliance on the Cleburne language has
led courts astray, see Mark Strasser, Unconstitutional?Don't Ask; if It Is, Don't Tell: On Deference,
Rationalityand the Constitution, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 375, 407-11 (1995).
193. Cf Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306-07 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (identifying
"the lack of comprehensive and neutral principles for drawing electoral boundaries" as an obstacle
for courts addressing claims of gerrymandering). On the role of baseline questions in voting rights
jurisprudence, see, for example, Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of
Its Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1710 (2004); Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the
Retrogressionof Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J. 21 (2004); Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time:
ReapportionmentAfter the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REv. 731, 741-45 (1998); Richard H. Pildes,
The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-Foreword:The Constitutionalizationof Democratic Politics, 118
HARv. L. REV. 29, 58-59 (2004). On the recurrence of baseline questions in public law, see CAss R.
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1993).
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If the idea is that a group suffering bias sufficiently substantial to warrant judicial intervention could expect to secure no legislative victories and
no political support for its priorities, then the ability of LGBT rights advocates to secure antidiscrimination legislation in California and beyond
would rightly undercut any finding of a political malfunction. But there is
no obvious reason to suppose that the relevant idea of political power ought
to be all or nothing in this way. Nor would such a categorical understanding
have much purchase as a purely descriptive matter, given the proliferation of
antidiscrimination legislation protecting racial minorities and women.
Moreover, identifying the relevant baseline begins to get both enigmatic
and interesting when we recognize that there is no particular reason to believe that LGBT people would be politically organized and active as LGBT
people in the way that has become familiar but for the phenomena that
called into being the organization of their social movement.194 The animating
goal that gave rise to the gay rights movement was, precisely, to dislodge
longstanding structures of discrimination-that is, to bring about the end of
criminal bans on consensual sexual activity, pervasive job and other kinds of
discrimination, violent hate crimes, the lack of any legal infrastructure to
protect gay couples and families, and, more broadly, a social regime that
policed traditional gender roles and asked people to hide important aspects
of their identity. The dilemma is this: if the need to politically organize is
itself generated by long-term historical subordination, it is difficult to conjure the untainted baseline political process against which to measure the
current process, because there are good grounds to wonder whether LGBT
people would be legislatively active as LGBT people in the absence of that
subordination.
To come at the same basic idea from a different angle, it is similarly not
obvious, within the framework of political process theory, how to account
for the fact that the political power that exists is being devoted in a targeted way to combating longstanding discrimination. It hardly follows that
a group is politically "powerful" because it has achieved some success in
securing legal remedies against some of the formal and informal discrimination that has long burdened the group.' Recall Segura's analogy to the
194. For a comprehensive history of how not only gay people but other minority groups have
organized in response to "pervasive state exclusion, discrimination, and violence," see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on ConstitutionalLaw in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REv. 2062, 2070, 2072-194 (2002) [hereinafter Eskridge, Jr.,
ConstitutionalLaw in the Twentieth Century].
195. In his work on the rise of social movements asserting civil rights claims of various sorts,
Bill Eskridge suggests that movements pass through different phases as they achieve successes and
their political needs and identities change, with some movements and groups being absorbed into
what he calls "normal politics," and others-like the gay rights movement-struggling longer
against the resistance of traditionalist groups. Id. at 2373; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 419, 475-76 (2001)
[hereinafter Eskridge, Jr., Public Law]. His account, while comprehensive and careful in many
ways, is somewhat sanguine in generally placing rights movements on a trajectory toward assimilation into a realm of prosaic politics. Even with this optimism, Eskridge does not suggest that groups
reaching the "normal politics" stage in his model are thereby rendered powerful, nor that reaching
that stage means that the group's legacy of discrimination is left behind. See id. at 476 (noting that
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patient with prescriptions. It is better, most would presumably agree, for
someone who is sick to have the prescriptions than to be left to suffer
without them, but the patient still does not compare favorably to the
healthy person in need of no treatment at all. It also seems worth noting
that the money, endorsements, allies, and other political resources that
Miller emphasized in his testimony were hardly used to engage in rent seeking. The resources used to fight Prop. 8 were used to try to avoid the
constitutionally codified exclusion of same-sex couples from a social institution to which many LGBT people seek access. Indeed, the inherently
defensive quality of LGBT political efforts is embedded in the very question
whether members of the LGBT community can "protect themselves" in the
legislative process. Academic notions of a Hobbesian war of all against all
notwithstanding, the need for political self-protection is hardly universal.
Another way to express this is to say that what should stand out most
about the fact that LGBT people have secured multiple pieces of antidiscrimination legislation is not necessarily the political success it signifies, but
the extent and continuation of discrimination that makes these laws necessary in the first instance. The passage of legislation outlawing sexual
orientation-based discrimination in, say, employment or housing presumably reflects a legislative belief that there is sufficient anti-gay bias to warrant
protection from adverse decisions born of that bias. Nor is it credible to believe that the enactment of antidiscrimination laws alone spells the end of
the underlying discrimination. It seems perverse, then, to say that, under
process theory, the fact that sexual orientation-based antidiscrimination legislation has been deemed necessary by a majority of legislators on numerous
occasions in California is the smoking gun that demonstrates that excluding
same-sex couples from marriage in the state does not warrant close judicial
review. Viewed in this way, the need to resort repeatedly to the political
process-as heterosexuals qua heterosexuals do not-is the important signal
not of political power, but of social antipathy of sufficient magnitude to warrant legal redress.
All of this is not an argument that LGBT people lack any political power
at all-a principle that, so stated, is plainly wrong and oversimplified. It is
instead an argument that process theory does not and cannot tell us how
much, or what kind of, political power LGBT people "ought" to have in a
nondiscriminatory world. And it is also an argument that process theory is
misguided if it looks to the enactment of legislation alone, without asking
what kind of legislation exists, what gave rise to the need for that legislation,
or what effect the legislation has had.
while successful social movements ultimately join the fray of ordinary pluralist politics, they are
distinct in "that they deploy classifications that remain charged criteria of normative decisions in our
polity," and suggesting that the success of such movements "does not ensure the eradication of
prejudice against or stereotypes about the minority group," though it does change the nature of
countermovements against it).
196. On the limits of antidiscrimination laws as a general matter, see Jane S. Schacter, Skepticism, Culture and the Gay Civil Rights Debate in a Post-Civil-Rights Era, 110 HARv. L. REv. 684,
719 (1997) (book review).
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Just as process theory does not, on its own terms, clearly resolve questions about the preclusion thesis, so it fails to speak clearly to the frequent
use of direct democracy in challenging gay equality claims. Once again,
baseline questions lurk-this time about the number and kind of ballot initiatives, and the dynamics of initiative campaigns, that a fair and properly
functioning political process would tolerate or expect.
As Segura testified, the use of ballot measures to reverse or preempt gay
rights legislation has been a mainstay not only in the same-sex marriage
debate, but in the larger debate about gay rights over the last several decades. Indeed, from the time Anita Bryant led a referendum campaign to
repeal a gay civil rights ordinance enacted in Dade County, Florida in the
1970s, ballot measures have been put forward consistently by those opposing gay rights. Romer, the Supreme Court's leading case on sexual
orientation and equal protection, involved a statewide amendment enacted to
reverse and preempt antidiscrimination measures in Colorado that would
protect gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. Since the mid-1990s, thirty states have
used the ballot box to amend their state constitutions to bar same-sex marriage.'" No statewide ballot measure asking voters about same-sex marriage
has ever been voted down.'98 Nor are the high success rates on anti-samesex marriage measures unique to the context of marriage. Various scholars
have documented the substantial success rate of initiatives and referenda
restricting gay rights.'I All in all, direct democracy has been a formidable
force in blocking gay rights measures.
There are relatively straightforward arguments that the frequent and effective use of direct democracy to counter gay rights should be regarded as
a political process failure. Given the emphasis of process theory on, in
197. The Los Angeles Times has created an interactive map detailing the past decade of electoral activity. Interactive: Gay marriage chronology, L.A. TIMES, http://www.latimes.com/news/
local/la-gmtimeline-fl,0,5345296.htmlstory (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). For a discussion of how the
structure of state governments has affected same-sex marriage laws, see Neal Devins, How State
Supreme Courts Take Consequences Into Account: Toward a State-CenteredUnderstandingof State
Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1674-91 (2010). Note that some ballot measures have
been enacted by voters acting alone (as in California), while others have been enacted with legislative approval,
198. The only statewide measure to go down was an Arizona measure restricting both marriage and domestic partnerships. The initiative apparently aroused the ire of retirees who did not
want to lose domestic partnership status. A marriage-only ban was promptly passed by Arizona's
voters after this initial loss. See Monica Davey, Liberals Find Rays of Hope on Ballot Measures,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at P16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/ll/09/us/politics/
09ballots.html; Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States On Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 6, 2008, at At, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/t1/06us/politics/
06marriage.html.
199. See Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a PopularVote, 41 AM. J. POL. Scl. 245,
253, 257-60 (1997); Donald P. Haider-Markel et al., Lose, Win, or Draw? A Reexamination of Direct Democracy and Minority Rights, 60 POL. RES. Q. 304, 306-11 (2007). For a perspective more
skeptical of the idea that direct democracy necessarily harms minorities in general, see Zoltan L.
Hajnal et al., Minorities and Direct Legislation: Evidence from California Ballot PropositionElections, 64 J. POL. 154 (2002). Cf ARTHUR LUPIA ET AL., WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS DIFFER IN
THEIR TREATMENT OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (Munich Personal RePEC Archive, Paper No. 15096,
2009), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15096/1/MPRA-paper_15096.pdf (stressing
importance of procedural variations in how state constitutions can be amended).
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Ely's words, reinforcing representation, the absence of representation
itself in the sphere of direct democracy poses an immediate problem.
Moreover, normative arguments faulting direct democracy for selectively
harming small disadvantaged groups have long been pressed by legal
scholars, most prominently by Derrick Bell and the late Julian Eule.200
These arguments emphasize numerous factors, including the vulnerability of
numerical minorities in ballot elections; the absence of representational
safeguards, such as bicameralism and presentment, vetogates, and opportunities for amendment, compromise, coalition building, and logrolling; and
the loss of public deliberation and electoral accountability. These arguments
seem especially powerful when a ballot measure is used to amend a state
constitution and thus to embed unequal treatment of a minority in the state's
foundational political commitments.
Even assuming that direct democracy poses substantial political risks for
minorities, however, it is not entirely clear how process theory ought to treat
ballot measures. Questions remain, for example, about how often gay rights
ballot measures must lose ballot elections in order for these structural disadvantages to be realized and to count as process failures. What, for example,
is the relevance of the fact that gay rights advocates have consistently lost
on marriage, but have sometimes prevailed on other occasions? (For example, California measures targeting gay teachers and HIV-positive persons
were rejected by voters at the ballot box, and Washington voters recently
declined to repeal domestic partnerships.) Must every gay rights victory in
the legislative arena be subject to a ballot measure in order to reach the conclusion that the process is malfunctioning? (In California, most
antidiscrimination laws, as well as domestic partnership legislation, have not
been subjected to a popular vote.) Does it matter how much support the
LGBT community has received from legislators and elites? (Quite a lot in
the Prop. 8 campaign.) Does it matter if a disadvantaged group that loses a
ballot campaign nevertheless secures the support of a significant minority?
(Some 47 percent of voters statewide opposed Prop. 8.) Once again, process
theory lacks the conceptual tools to resolve questions like these in assessing
whether there is a political malfunction.20'

200. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54
L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1978); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of DirectDemocracy, 99 YALE L.J.
1503, 1526-28, 1551-56 (1990); see also supra note 198.

WASH.

Claims about the the risks that direct democracy poses for those opposing same-sex
201.
marriage have been suggested in Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2837 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(addressing the risks of disclosing the identities of petition-signers), and Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130
S. Ct. 705, 713 (2010) (citing seventy-one newspaper articles describing harassment of Prop. 8
supporters as evidence in favor of blocking any live broadcast of the resulting trial). In these contexts, opponents of same-sex marriage seek judicial protection, expressing fears of harassment.
These are not traditional equal protection arguments, but might be assimilated to a version of process theory. For a critique of these claims, see Pamela S. Karlan, The Gay and the Angry: The
Supreme Court and the Battles Surrounding Same-Sex Marriage(forthcoming 2011).
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B. InstitutionalCaricatures

A second set of problems with process theory that the marriage debate
reveals-and a second way in which process theory is thin-relates to its
institutional assumptions. There is a distinctly caricatured quality to the
roles that process theory assigns to courts and to legislatures.
Process theory is built on the assumption that, while legislatures will
predictably fall prey to-and remain mired in-forms of prejudice that will
skew and distort their approach to public policy, courts can and will overcome such prejudice in adjudication. In this way, process theory embraces
202
what we might call separate spheres -separate institutional spheres, that
is. The dichotomy it sets up is a simple one: Either the political process operates fairly and can be trusted to sort out social issues, or the political
process malfunctions based on bias and courts must step in to rescue the
populace and its representatives from themselves. It is one or the other.
There is nothing terribly unfamiliar about this idea, which suffuses and
shapes traditional thinking about the roles to be played by different institutions of government within a system of divided power and checks and
balances. But a core empirical problem with this view is that, while the vision of courts as consistent countermajoritarian forces has deep and
enduring normative appeal, it is not empirically well supported. Various
scholars, including Barry Friedman in a recent book, have shown that
courts, across the long march of history, are not often all that far out of step
with popular opinion or out front on controversial social issues.203 In fact,
courts typically do not act before the broader society of which they are a
part has taken some significant steps.204 Elected judges may be especially
likely to align their decisions with broad currents of public opinion, but appointed judges, too, typically act only after processes of social change are
underway and there is a broader sense in society that traditional attitudes
toward a group are unfair and may be antiquated. A striking example of this
general idea in the realm of LGBT rights is the shift in the Supreme Court's
evaluation of the constitutionality of criminalizing sodomy. This shift is
202. On the idea of separate spheres in the domain of gender, see the classic description in
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). But see NANCY
F. Corr, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEw ENGLAND, 1730-1835, at 197206 (2d ed. 1997); Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:" Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 819 (1985).
203. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 364-65 (2009); see also
Gregory A. Caldeira, Courts and Public Opinion, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 303, 313-19 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991); Michael J. Klarman,
Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REv. 1 (1996) (arguing that
neither the countermajoritarian arguments nor the noncountermajoritarian arguments are completely

correct and that the truth is in the middle).
204. See Klarmain, supra note 203. In adopting what I see as a realistic picture of courts, one
need not go quite as far as Gerald Rosenberg does in his classic book; Rosenberg is deeply skeptical
that courts can produce meaningful reform and views them as only a dangerous distraction for those
seeking genuine social change. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).
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overruling Bowers v.

Hardwick-a shift more plausibly attributed to surrounding social change
than to any doctrinal niceties.2 05 Viewed in this light, then, process theory is
premised on the faulty notion of courts as a leading, not trailing, indicator.
In the context of same-sex marriage, the institutional role of courts visA-vis legislatures is mixed. 09 On the one hand, it is important to recognize
that courts ruling in favor of same-sex marriage were the first movers. The
Hawaii court in 1993 and the Massachusetts court in 2003, for example,
acted on marriage before any state legislatures did, and they issued opinions
that were ahead of extant public opinion on marriage. In some sense they
provide support for the idea, grounded in process theory, that courts can and
should act when the political process will not.
But there is an important caveat. It strikes me as no accident that no state
supreme court was prepared to accept a marriage equality claim before the
gay rights movement had advanced its cause significantly. In fact, three
early marriage equality cases brought in the early 1970s, shortly after the
birth of the modem gay rights movement, were rejected rather dismissively
by appellate courts.207 It was not until 1993-nearly twenty-five years into
the modem gay rights movement-that Hawaii signaled its readiness to
move on same-sex marriage under that state's constitutional equal rights
amendment, 20 and ten years later that the Massachusetts court actually became the first to legalize same-sex marriage.20 By this time, there had been
many significant advances in social attitudes about homosexuality and many
prior legislative steps toward equality.210
Indeed, in every state whose supreme court issued a judicial decision
favorable to same-sex couples, the political process had taken significant
strides toward recognizing gay civil rights by the time the court ruled. Recall that seven state supreme courts in all have issued a ruling favorable to
same-sex couples.211 When six of these state supreme courts-all but
Hawaii's-ruled, their states had already enacted at least three kinds of
statewide legislation-an antidiscrimination law in employment and/or

205.

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 203, at 358-60.

206. For an account that traces in careful detail the relative positions of courts and legislatures
in states with judicial rulings on same-sex marriage, see Scott Barclay, In Search of Judicial Activism in the Same-Sex Marriage Cases: Sorting the Evidence from Courts, Legislatures, Initiatives
and Amendments, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 111 (2010).
207. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185
(Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
208. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.), reconsiderationgranted in part, 875 P.2d 225
(Haw. 1993), appeal after remand sub nom., Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), and order
aff'd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997).
209.

See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).

210. For an overview, see Schacter, supra note 25. For an advocate's perspective on how the
accretion of favorable law shapes litigation decisions, see Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context,
40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (2005).
211.

See supra Section I.B.3.
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housing that extended to sexual orientation;212 a hate crime law that extended to sexual orientation; 213 and a law regulating bullying, harassment,
or discrimination against LGBT youth in schools.214 And when the Hawaii
Supreme Court ruled, that state had already enacted statewide antidiscrinination legislation and promulgated an ethical code regarding anti-gay
211
bullying/harassment in schools. In addition, some of these states had already extended some adoption rights for same-sex couples, either statewide
or in some jurisdictions within the state, and all seven have extended some
adoption rights today.216 None of these state courts, in other words, was situated in a social or legal context of special hostility to gay rights.
There are, of course, many states that can be fairly characterized as
broadly hostile to gay rights. Take Mississippi and Alabama as examples.
These are states with plenty of statewide legislation restricting LGBT rights
and no sexual orientation-based nondiscrimination legislation."" These are
states with a political process deeply inhospitable to any idea that LGBT
equality claims might legitimately trump traditional cultural values. Yet,
contrary to the assumption of process theory, it is strikingly implausible to
think that judges in these states can or will stand apart from prevailing public opinion and take action to compensate for anti-gay bias decades before
the political process shows movement on marriage or other issues of concern to LGBT citizens of the state. Such a prospect, indeed, depends in the
first instance on the improbable notion that courts in these states would
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2007); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12920 (West 2005); CONN.
§§ 46a-81c to -81m (2007); IOWA CODE § 216.6 (2009); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 15IB,
§§ 3-4 (LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:2-1 (West 2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503
(2006).
212.

GEN. STAT.

213. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.55 (West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-181j (2007);
IOWA CODE §§ 729A.1-.2 (2009); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 39 (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:16-1 (West 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455 (2009).
See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 220 (West 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-15c(a) (2007); IOWA
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 76, § 5 (LexisNexis 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 18A:37-13 to -17 (West 1999 & Supp. 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 14 (2006).
214.

CODE

§ 280.12(2)(c) (2010);

215. See HAW. CODE R. § 8-19-2 (LexisNexis 2006) (defining "harassment" as "[m]aking
verbal or non-verbal expressions that causes others to feel uncomfortable, pressured, threatened, or
in danger because of ... gender identity and expression ... or sexual orientation").
216. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b) (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-726a (2007);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 578-1 (LexisNexis 2010); IOWA CODE § 600.4 (2009); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 210, § 1 (LexisNexis 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-43 (West 2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A,

§ 1-102 (2002).
217. Recent events in Iowa suggest that the adoption of gay rights measures in a state does not
necessarily equate to acceptance of same-sex marriage. In November 2010, the three Iowa Supreme
Court justices who faced a retention election were ousted by voters because of their votes in 2009 in
favor of marriage equality. See A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 4, 2010, at Al.

218. See State Laws, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.orglaws-andelections/state.asp
(last visited Feb. 21, 2011) (noting that Mississippi and Alabama have no such protective legislation); State Nondiscrimination Laws in the U.S. Map, NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE,
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue-maps/non-discrimination-7_09-color.pdf

(last updated July 1, 2009) (indicating those states without sexual orientation-based protective legislation).
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characterizeas anti-gay bias the resistance of legislators and citizens to gay
*219
equality claims.
The courts that moved on same-sex marriage were, in short, located in
states that had already made significant strides in some areas of LGBT
rights. 220 This was not, of course, mere coincidence. These states were chosen, strategically, by litigators seeking a favorable forum.22 ' But contrasting
Massachusetts with Mississippi does underscore the problems with any categorical notion that courts, as institutions, can and do stand meaningfully
apart from their social circumstances.
It is worth noting that, in other contexts, courts are also unlikely to be
first movers in acting against particular kinds of discrimination. When the
Supreme Court heightened scrutiny based on gender in 1976, for example,
numerous federal statutes already protected women against discrimina222
tion. Or, consider the case of disability. In 1985, the Cleburne case
accorded rational basis review-albeit in muscular form-to a classification
based on mental disability,22 and the Court has not heightened scrutiny for
disability-based claims since then. Yet Congress and many states have accorded a far greater degree of statutory protection to people with
disabilities. In fact, by 1985, federal legislation had already banned recipients of federal funds from discriminating based on disability for several
224
years. A few years after Cleburne, in 1990, Congress passed the more
broadly applicable Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). 225 Indeed, when the ADA was passed, it contained an express finding in its
preamble stating-with no apparent irony-that people with disabilities are
"in a position of political powerlessness."226 This is a pointed reminder that
219. On the question of judges sharing broader social biases in the gay rights arena, see
Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 986-88 (2011).
220. This is consistent with Scott Barclay's analysis disputing the idea that state courts ruling
in favor of same-sex marriage have been activist, and finding that courts in this area have very rarely
acted "in direct contradiction of [recently expressed legislative] preferences." Barclay, supra note
206, at 122-23.
221. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for MarriageEquality, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1235 (2010) (chronicling the strategic choices of lawyers in the same-sex marriage
movement).
222. Patsy Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 168 1(a) (2006);
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (2006); Title VH of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -3 (2006).
223. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); see supra note 66
and accompanying text.
224. See Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of
1978, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
225. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
226.

In the Act, Congress explained as follows:

[Individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated
to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond
the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative
of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society[.]
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courts have no necessary monopoly on the ability to identify and to try to
rectify persistent bias that can limit and burden historically disadvantaged
groups.
This observation, moreover, takes us back to the preclusion thesis discussed earlier, and suggests a different way to understand the enactment of
antidiscrimination legislation in the context of process theory. It suggests
that, in fact, enactment of prior legislation protecting groups may be a signal
to courts that the group is a plausible candidate for protection. Organizing
and political success, in other words, can do the normative work of legitimating a group for the purposes of process theory by signaling that the
group is entitled to fair treatment in the political process.22 To go back to a
point made years ago by Laurence Tribe in contesting Ely's claim that process theory could be value-neutral, the court deciding whether to heighten
scrutiny needs a way to know whether a minority group should be protected
or should be treated like, say, burglars, who do not pose a credible case for
judicial protection because the social opprobrium that is directed toward
228
them is perceived to remain legitimate. Legislative passage of antidiscrimination legislation, as a descriptive matter, might be seen as providing
that sort of cue to courts.
Notice, however, the catch-22 that is at work here. On the one hand, a
group seeking judicial protection under process theory must demonstrate its
legitimacy for judicial protection; it must show, as Tribe suggested, that it is
not like the group "burglars." Having secured the passage of antidiscrimination legislation may be seen as evidence of that approval. On the other hand,
however, the enactment of antidiscrimination legislation may trigger assertion of the preclusion thesis and be offered up as proof that, far from being
analogous to burglars, the group is a potent political interest group. Either
way, the arrow points to disqualification from enhanced judicial solicitude.
All of this suggests that it is problematic to regard courts and legislatures as occupying sharply separated spheres. There are also other aspects of
the marriage debate that suggest another problem with the separate spheres
idea: the idea obscures the fact that courts and legislatures stand in an interactive relation to one another. Since its inception in 1993, in fact, the samesex marriage debate has featured an ongoing set of actions and reactions
among courts, elected officials, and voters.229 Once courts took early steps in
favor of same-sex marriage, severe and pervasive backlash followed in the
form of statutory and constitutional measures against marriage equality
Id. § 2(a)(7), 104 Stat. at 329 (amended 2008).
227. On the need for social ratification before the extension of heightened scrutiny, see Eskridge, Jr., Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, supra note 194, at 2064-66; Eskridge, Jr.,
Public Law, supra note 195, at 513; Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer,
Lawrence, and the Inevitable Nonnativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1312, 1314
(2004). Eskridge's analysis aptly dubs this dynamic the "paradox of the tiers." See Eskridge, Jr.,
ConstitutionalLaw in the Twentieth Century, supra note 194, at 2267.
228. Tribe, supra note 7, at 1075 (noting that burglars are denied heightened constitutional
scrutiny because burglary is judged to merit social disapproval).
229.

See Barclay, supra note 206; Schacter, supra note 25.
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passed in more than forty states after 1993,230 enactment of DOMA by Congress in 1996,231 a proposed federal constitutional marriage amendment
232
endorsed by a sitting president in 2004, and more recently the ouster of
three Iowa justices who voted in favor or marriage equality. But alongside
that backlash also came substantial progress. Five states and the District of
Columbia now recognize marriage equality;234 two states recognize same-sex
marriages performed elsewhere, even though they do not themselves allow
same-sex residents to marry; 3 and ten states offer some form of civil union/domestic partnership benefits, some of which are comprehensive and
others of which are quite narrow. The picture is, thus, complex, with multidirectional causal arrows making it difficult to tell any simple story. The
significant point to see for our purposes is that courts and the political process are influenced by, and responsive to, one another. This is a very different
idea than the one embraced by classic process theory, in which the institutional choice is framed in either/or terms, and courts are seen as standing
apart from the political process and as immune from the forces that shape it.
III.

IMPLICATIONS: MAPPING A ROAD TO FOOTNOTE

4.1

A. DoctrinalReform

Where does this all lead? One response might be to recalibrate the doctrine to try to address the problems identified here. First, and most modestly,
230.

See Schacter, supra note 25, at 1155 (citing Anti-Gay MarriageMeasures in the U.S.

Map, NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue-

maps/GayMarriage_05_09.pdf (last updated May 6, 2009)).
231.

Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).

232. See Schacter, supra note 25, at 1188 ("President George W. Bush endorsed a federal
constitutional amendment to outlaw same-sex marriage, and the issue became a salient one in the
2004 presidential election." (citing President's Radio Address, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1286 (July 10,
2004))).
233.

See Sulzberger, supra note 217.

234. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Baker
v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999). New Hampshire and the District of Columbia went on to
legislate in favor of full marriage equality. See Schacter, supra note 25, at 1189 n.225.
235. The states are New York and Maryland. See Schacter, supra note 25, at 1189-90 & n.225.
New York began to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states after an executive order
issued by then-Governor David Paterson on May 14, 2008. See Jeremy Peters, New York to Back SameSex Unions Performed Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMEs, May 29, 2008, at Al. Maryland began recognizing
same-sex marriages performed elsewhere after state Attorney General Douglas Gansler issued an opinion on February 24, 2010. See John Wagner, Gansler: Effective Immediately Md. Recognizes Same-Sex
Marriages Performed Elsewhere, WASH. PosT, Feb. 24, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.coml/
annapolis/2010/02/gansler-marylands high-court_1.html; Schacter, supra note 25, at 1189-90 &
n.225.
236. New Jersey, California, Oregon, Washington, and Nevada (broad laws); Colorado, Maryland, Wisconsin, Maine, and Hawaii (narrow laws). Id. Illinois will soon be added to the list of states
with broad laws; its comprehensive civil unions bill, passed in December 2010, is scheduled to take
effect in June 2011. Understanding Civil Unions in Illinois, EQUALITY ILL., 1, http://
www.equalityillinois.org/cmsdocuments/CivilUnions_FAQs.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
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we might revisit the criteria used by courts to decide whether heightened

scrutiny is appropriate. Recall that the Supreme Court's current case law
generally asks groups seeking heightened scrutiny to show past discrimination, political powerlessness, common use of a stereotype or trait unrelated
to merit, and, perhaps, immutability. Spurred by the complexities we have
seen, we might refashion these criteria. Looking closely at LGBT political
power has suggested that it is both problematic and unwise to try to disentangle political power from past discrimination because the two are so
thoroughly entwined.23 Thus, the powerlessness criterion might be better
conceptualized as something to be assessed, explicitly, as an aspect of past
discrimination-that is, as a continuing manifestation of past discrimination
that has impaired the group in the political process, as it has impaired the
group in other domains. Seeing the political process question as something
related to past discrimination, as opposed to something independent of it,
could allow a court to account for when the political "power" a disadvantaged group might have displayed has, crucially, arisen and developed in the
face of pervasive past discrimination.
There are two other plausible doctrinal reforms suggested by the samesex marriage debate, but they would-paradoxically--cut in opposite directions. One would be to extend the tiers of scrutiny, and the other would be to
eliminate them. The case for extending the tiers of scrutiny would proceed
from the observations made earlier about the crudity of political process
analysis and the associated need to disaggregate and particularize the concept of political power. Rather than asking, in a generalized fashion, about a
group's power across the political process, the inquiry might instead consider whether there are any specific democratic venues in which the political
process poses particular fairness challenges. Heightened scrutiny could then
be triggered in any such problematic area. The use of direct democracy
against minority interests might reasonably be subject to such skeptical review by courts. For reasons discussed earlier, the persistent practice of
countering LGBT rights gains with popular initiatives raises distinctive and
substantial questions of democratic fairness, given the informational dynamics that shape ballot campaigns and the representational safeguards that the
process lacks.23 An approach attuned to the distinctive risks posed by direct
democracy would offer a more fine-grained approach to tiered scrutiny by
framing not an undifferentiated inquiry about groups, but a more targeted
analysis about how groups have fared in particular political venues or institutions.
On the other hand, one might well think the sensible thing to do in light of
the problems we have seen with process theory is not to extend, but to eliminate, levels of scrutiny. As I hope I have shown, the marriage debate casts
237.

See supra Section II.A.

238. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text. On the informational dynamics in the
Prop. 8 campaign, see Ruth Butterfield Isaacson, Comment, "Teachable Moments": The Use of
Child-Centered Arguments in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 121, 148-52
(2010) (describing in detail the advertising campaign in support of Prop. 8 and arguing that it sent a
"powerful and fearful message" to voters).
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serious doubt on the very project of calibrating judicial review according to
how fair a political shake a group is able to receive. And, as we have seen,
some of the same line-drawing questions and issues of scope and application
that plague standard process theory are likely to recur in a more contextualized inquiry focused on direct democracy.239 Moreover, the marriage debate
casts a more general shadow of skepticism over the tiers of scrutiny themselves. The extent to which the levels of review are imprecise and elastic
is nicely illustrated by the state supreme court rulings on same-sex marriage.
Recall that the courts ruling in favor of marriage equality have done so under every standard of review, suggesting that the formal tiers may be of
more rhetorical than substantive significance. Romer and Lawrence, both
decided under a form of rational basis review, point in the same direction.
All of this suggests that standard political process analysis, tied as it is to
levels of scrutiny, is something of a distracting sideshow-one that might be
avoided by deploying a singular standard that takes into account, as appropriate, a range of factors, including objections to the underlying political
process that generated a challenged law.
The road to rechanneling process theory might begin with Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence. Recall that O'Connor used a muted
form of process theory in her argument that the Texas sodomy law ought to
be struck down under the protean version of contemporary rational basis
review that she deployed in her equal protection analysis. 2 41 The gist of her
argument was to connect the fact that Texas only banned conduct involving
same-sex partners with the conclusion that the sodomy law reflected a "bare
... desire to harm a politically unpopular group."242 Whereas the ordinary
democratic process can usually be counted on to correct flawed public policy, she suggested, that assumption is inoperative where, as in Texas, the
majority has exempted itself from the restriction imposed on an unpopular
243
group. Under O'Connor's analysis, the idea that the majority lacked any
legitimate reason to ban only the minority's sexual conduct was a substantive conclusion that was informed by ideas about the circumstances in which
the political process is most likely to deliver a biased result. She thus considered the political process as it bore on the substantive question of
rationality, not for its own sake or as it related to the analytically discrete
question of standard of review. True, her analysis maps on to a more demanding version of rationality review. Her approach might thus be read to
ask whether "heightened rational basis" is the appropriate level of review to
239.

See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.

240. For an incisive critique of the tiers of scrutiny and a suggested revamping, see Suzanne
B. Goldberg, Equality Without hTers, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 481 (2004).
241.

See supra notes 90-95.

242. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting U.S.
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
243. Id. at 584-85 ("I am confident, however, that so long as the Equal Protection Clause
requires a sodomy law to apply equally to the private consensual conduct of homosexuals and heterosexuals alike, such a law would not long stand in our democratic society.").
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apply in light of the political process malfunctions she finds. But understood
in that way, O'Connor's inquiry simply reproduces a version of tiered scrutiny within the framework of rational basis. That is not, I believe, the best
reading of O'Connor's concurrence, nor is it the only one. The better reading is one that connects evidence about a group's experience in the political
process directly to the question of substantive rationality.
Indeed, an approach roughly of this sort might be distilled from Judge
Walker's decision on Prop. 8 and, more specifically, in how it used the evidence from the political scientists in that case. Recall that Walker carefully
parsed the testimony relevant to the criteria for heightened scrutiny and asserted that he thought those criteria had been met, yet ultimately dispensed
with the application of heightened scrutiny because he concluded that even
rationality review could not be satisfied.244 In assessing whether a rational
basis could support Prop. 8, however, Walker cited testimony relating to the
political process. He cited it, though, as it bore directly on rationality, not as
it bore on level of scrutiny. Walker made four findings of fact that drew on
the testimony of Segura and/or Miller, and each offered support for the opinion's core finding that no rational justification supported Prop. 8. The
opinion cited testimony that was originally elicited on LGBT political power
in support of the findings that "[p]ublic and private discrimination against
gays and lesbians occurs in California and in the United States" ;245 that
"[r]eligious beliefs that gay and lesbian relationships are sinful or inferior to
heterosexual relationships harm gays and lesbians"; 246 that "[s]tereotypes
and misinformation have resulted in social and legal disadvantages for gays
and lesbians"; 247 and that "[t]he Proposition 8 campaign relied on fears that
children exposed to the concept of same-sex marriage may become gay or
lesbian." 248
This cross-contextual use of evidence underscores that many of the matters framed by process theory are centrally relevant to the equal protection
question raised by the marriage debate, but not in the form that process theory conventionally dictates. The core equality question in the case is
whether there is any legitimate reason to exclude same-sex couples from a
244.

See supra Section I.B.4.c.

245. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 981-82 (N.D. Cal.) (citing, in finding of
fact number 75, testimony by Segura on anti-gay violence and Miller on anti-gay bias, stereotypes,
and job discrimination), stay denied, 702 F. Supp. 2d. 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2010), stay granted, 2010
WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010, and certifying question to the Supreme Court of California,
628 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2011).
246. Id. at 985-86 (citing, in finding of fact number 77, testimony by Segura on the powerful
effect on political debates of the "teaching" by organized religious entities "that gays are morally
inferior").
247. Id. at 986-88 (citing, in finding of fact number 78, testimony by Segura and Miller on
the frequent passage of anti-gay rights initiatives, by Miller on the existence of anti-gay prejudice
among some Prop. 8 voters, and by Segura on the low scores earned by gays and lesbians on feeling
thermometers used to measure public opinion toward social groups).
248. Id. at 988-90 (citing, in finding of fact number 79, testimony by Miller on the fact that
some Prop. 8 voters were motivated by prejudice and by Segura that one "enduring . . . trope[] of
anti-gay argumentation has been that gays are a threat to children" (first omission in original)).
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public institution otherwise open to all. 24 The court is at pains to identify
this question in its opinion as the one on which the case hinges.2so Evidence
about the experience of LGBT people in the political process bears on this
question, writ small because it elucidates the particular environment in
which Prop. 8 was passed, and writ large because it elucidates the more
general dynamics that shape and structure collective judgments about sexual
orientation.
More specifically, the experience of LGBT people in the political process sheds light on the core issue of public justification because persistent
anti-gay bias is reflected both by and in that process. It is reflected by the
political process to the extent that the group has repeatedly had to try to use
the political process to repeal laws that codify governmental discrimination
(not only marriage laws, but also bans on military service and parenting
rights, for example) and to seek new laws to address persistent social problems, such as hate crimes and discrimination in employment, housing, and
various other arenas. Continuing bias is reflected in the process by evidence
of how the group has been treated. Here is where the frequent, selective use
of ballot measures to defeat pro-gay measures or enact anti-gay ones is most
plainly relevant-not because it supports heightening scrutiny, but because
it reflects persistent public hostility on gay issues. Similarly relevant are the
low readings achieved by gay people on the "feeling thermometer[s]" that
political scientists employ to measure public affect toward various groups.251
The low thermometer readings in and of themselves provide evidence of the
kind of public animus emphasized by the Supreme Court in Romer. Beyond
that general relevance, there is a significant correlation between negative
attitudes on same-sex marriage and low thermometer scores given to gay
people. This correlation was observed by Nathaniel Persily, Patrick Egan,
and Kevin Wallsten in their analysis of public opinion on same-sex mar252
riage. This evidence surely does not mean that every voter opposed to
same-sex marriage bears animosity toward gay people, for there are undoubtedly different reasons in play for different voters. Indeed, one of the
difficult challenges in case like this one is how to impute a collective intent
or purpose to the large electorate.253 The correlation observed by Persily,
249. Because the state itself is not defending Prop. 8, ballot sponsors, acting as intervenors,
have asserted interests on behalf of the state. The standing of intervenors to appeal the district
court's decision is being contested in the Ninth Circuit and will be resolved by that court with assistance from the California Supreme Court, the views of which the federal appellate court has sought.
See Jesse McKinley, California: Judges Ask for Clarity On Same-Sex Marriage Measure, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 5, 2011, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/us/05brfsJUDGESASKFORBRF.html?scp=1&sq=9th%20circuit%20standing&st=cse. On the problems
with allowing intervenors to speak on behalf of the state in defending Prop. 8, see Pamela S. Karlan,
Old Reasons, New Reasons, No Reasons 13-16 (draft on file with author).
250.

See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 973-91, 995-1003.

251.

See supra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.

252.

See Patrick J. Egan, Nathaniel Persily & Kevin Wallsten, Gay Rights, in PUBLIC OPINION
234, app. B at 260 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008).

AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY

253. See generally Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": Interpretive Dilemmas
in DirectDemocracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995).
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Egan, and Wallsten does, however, suggest a link between Romer-style animus and attitudes on the marriage question. That inference, in turn, comes
directly into play on rationality review and casts significant doubt on the
reasons offered to support the ban.
In sum, whether arguments like these do or do not carry the day for
those challenging Prop. 8, there are good reasons to reframe the inquiry
away from the satellite question of political powerlessness as it relates to the
level of review, and toward the core equality questions at stake.
B. Equality and Democracy Reconsidered

Doctrinal reforms of the sort just canvassed are worth considering, but
the problems with process theory go beyond the domain of doctrine and
strike at the theory's central conceptual aspiration-to reconcile controversial judicial decisions with the dictates of democracy. As we have seen,
process theory never really undertakes to define and elaborate democracy, or
to explain with any particularity why and when entrenched disadvantage is
inconsistent with democracy. In terms of its central premise, it should not be
a surprise that process theory sidesteps thorny definitional questions. Recall,
for example, Ely's animating claim that his rules of representation reinforcement allow courts to avoid controversial normative choices. It would be
starkly at odds with that claim to enlist judges in identifying,
articulating, and applying specific criteria about precisely what democracy
requires. Yet, in drawing key lines and selecting from among the many
norms that inspire different understandings and theories of democracy
(pluralist vs. deliberative, participatory vs. elite, direct vs. representative,
214
etc.), contestable substantive choices cannot be avoided.
The failure to develop a more specific theory of democracy is no small
omission. As we have seen, it is an important part of what gives process
theory a certain emptiness at its core.255 While process theory's signature
flight from substance is unsuccessful for all the reasons we have seen,
there is, at a high level of abstraction, a principle of democratic equality
that can be salvaged from the theory-though, concededly, this salvaged
enterprise has somewhat the feel of killing something to save it. The idea
of democratic equality I have in mind is unabashedly substantive, not
procedural. It is less about institutions (courts vs. legislatures) than it is
about the culture and fabric of democracy. It implicates the broader conditions of democratic citizenship, not the formal political process alone. And
it is well illustrated by the same-sex marriage debate.
Several of the findings in the Perry decision mark the path to a different
understanding of democratic equality. In addition to finding the state's
254. For a discussion of these choices and the particular problems they pose for Ely, see Jane
S. Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REv. 737 (2004).
255. It also leaves process theory vulnerable to critiques like that offered by Bruce Ackerman,
who pointed out that, for various reasons, diffuse and anonymous minorities may actually have a
harder time in the political process than do discrete and insular minorities. See Ackerman, supra
note 9.
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justifications inextricably intertwined with bias and stereotypes, and thus
lacking a rational basis, the opinion launches a second-though plainly
related-line of analysis. Several findings fault Prop. 8 for
unconstitutionally "enshrin[ing] in the California Constitution the notion
that opposite-sex couples are superior to same-sex couples.", 6 The court
also seized, in particular, on the expressive implications of the state enacting
Prop. 8 while relegating same-sex couples to what the court saw as the less
socially valued institution of domestic partnership. Along these lines, the
court made findings, for example, that "Proposition 8 places the force of law
behind stigmas against gays and lesbians"; 257 that "Proposition 8 singles out
gays and lesbians and legitimates their unequal treatment" ;258 that
"Proposition 8 reserves the most socially valued form of relationship
(marriage) for opposite-sex couples"; 25 9 and that "[t]he availability of
domestic partnership does not provide gays and lesbians with a status
equivalent to marriage because the cultural meaning of marriage and its
associated benefits are intentionally withheld from same-sex couples in
domestic partnerships."2 6
The significance of these findings is that they present Prop. 8 as undermining democracy by unsubtly and unmistakably codifying a social
hierarchy. The findings cast Prop. 8 as inscribing in the state constitution a
principle of stratification that disadvantages a small numerical minority in
relation to a significant public institution, disparages that minority in so doing, and cuts off the group's means of ordinary political recourse. This
principle, in turn, stands at odds with what ought to be central to democratic
261
theory-the basic ideal of equal citizenship.
One might argue that, because California grants almost all the rights of
marriage to same-sex couples through domestic partnership, there is, in fact,
no problematic hierarchy of citizens. The question of how to understand and
give meaning to the state's comprehensive partnership protections is one
256. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1002-03 (N.D. Cal.) ("Proposition 8 was
premised on the belief that same-sex couples simply are not as good as opposite-sex couples....
[T]his belief is not a proper basis on which to legislate." (citations omitted)), stay denied, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2010), stay granted, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010), and
certifying question to the Supreme Court of California, 628 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2011) Perry mentions ballot proponents' desire to "advance the belief that opposite-sex couples are morally superior
to same-sex couples." Id.
257.

Id. at 973.

258.

Id. at 979.

259.

Id. at 974.

260.

Id. at 971.

261. On sexual orientation and hierarchy, see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996)
("One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the Constitution 'neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.'" (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting))). On sexual orientation inequality and democracy, see Jane S. Schacter,
Lawrence v. Texas and the FourteenthAmendments Democratic Aspirations, 13 TEMP. PoL. & Civ.
RTs. L. REv. 733 (2004); Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain, 50 VAND. L.
REv. 361 (1997). On the ways in which hierarchies undermine equal citizenship, see KENNETH L.
KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1991);

Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313 (1997).
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that I regard as quite complex. It implicates difficult questions about social
meaning and the complex dynamics that shape it. 262 It is possible to imagine,
in the manner of a thought experiment, a world in which the creation of a
distinctive institution for same-sex relationships did not necessarily connote
and communicate a stigmatizing meaning. 263 As I have suggested elsewhere,
had same-sex couples and the larger LGBT movement chosen to pursue and
shape an alternative institution in an affirmative embrace of difference, the
constitutional issues might have unfolded differently.264 But that hypothetical
world is not the world in which we live. In the real world, same-sex couples
have, in great numbers, sought to marry and often encountered harsh and
demeaning denial.
It also bears noting that some nineteen of the thirty states with antimarriage constitutional amendments265 much more pervasively disadvantage
same-sex couples than do states, like California, that recognize civil unions
or broad domestic partnership rights. These nineteen states more broadly
deny legal protections to same-sex couples. In such states, the constitutional
codification of inequality is subordinating in both a functional and an
expressive sense. It might thus seem paradoxical and perverse to focus on
California's choice to pursue functional but not expressive equality. While
California's choice to protect same-sex couples has undeniable virtues, the
state's extension of robust domestic partnership rights is nevertheless a twoedged sword in ways illustrated by the Perry litigation. If California is
willing to grant virtually all the substantive rights and responsibilities of
marriage, the question remains what interest could plausibly justify
withholding the more valued name from only one group that wishes to use
it-other than a communal desire to mark, precisely, the superiority of one
set of unions over the other. In *other words, once the functional
justifications are taken out of play by the grant of domestic partnership
rights, the justification for differentiating the two institutions, and for
denying LGBT people the choice of which institution to enter, must lie
elsewhere. And there is no compelling competition for the codification-ofinferiority hypothesis to explain it.
On this view, then, it is particular relations of codified hierarchy that
undermine democratic citizenship and equality. Constitutional rejection of
262. See Jane S. Schacter, The Other Same-Sex MarriageDebate, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 379,
394-98 (2009) (probing the extent to which "social groups, especially historically subordinated
ones, can shape the social meaning of their own choices and struggles"). See generally Lawrence
Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHi. L. REv. 943 (1995).
263. See Schacter, supra note 262 (arguing that marriage has become a showdown question on
gay equality for both proponents and opponents of gay rights in ways that further the idea of domestic partnerships as second class, but exploring as counterfactual whether debate over domestic
partnerships might have unfolded differently had gay community expressed more affirmative interest in shaping a separate institution rather than in gaining access to marriage).
264.

See id. at 396-97.

Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
265.
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
and Wisconsin. See State Laws ProhibitingRecognition of Same-Sex Relationships Map, supra note
36.
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such relations promotes a set of democratic values and, in this sense, connects to the normative ambitions of process theory. The connection exists,
however, only at a high level of abstraction. Unlike process theory, this
approach to democracy and disadvantage makes no claim to be a valuefree species of proceduralism. It embraces the need to make contested
substantive choices in giving meaning to the constitutional idea of equal
protection. But it does not-and cannot-make strong claims of determinacy in its application. There is no singular answer to the question of what
kind of democracy the Constitution creates or demands. But this approach
does productively rechannel the debate in the vocabulary of democracy. Underscoring the powerful legitimating effect of the idea of democracy, the
approach outlined here rejects the simple normative equation of majoritarianism with democracy and presses those engaged in debates about same-sex
marriage-and beyond-to consider the distinctively democratic dimensions of core constitutional values, such as equality, liberty, and
*266
citizenship.
Similarly, this approach is not principally institutionalin nature. That is,
the principle of democratic equality suggested here is not one limited to
identifying the circumstances in which courts can legitimately be aggressive. As we have seen, courts often do not act alone, and are not necessarily
more likely, or better able, to act against relations of antidemocratic hierarchy than are legislatures. Elected officials, too, can pursue marriage equality
in the name of equal citizenship, and legislative appeals have frequently
267
been framed in these terms. Thus, rather than being an idea designed only
to divide labor between courts and political bodies, this approach reflects an
unabashedly substantive principle about the importance of a multiinstitutional commitment to equal democratic citizenship, broadly understood. Courts have a role to play, and the Prop. 8 case illustrates what that
role might look like. But other institutions also have, and must have, a role.
One last point grows out of this emphasis on multiple institutions, and it
bears emphasis. Laying out the ways in which Prop. 8 undermines democratic equality in ways inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause does not
resolve the question whether it was a wise course to litigate the issue in fed-

266. For a collection of sources setting out some aspects of the general approach in greater
detail, see supra note 261.
267. See, e.g., John M. Hubbell, Gay marriage bill fails by 4 votes in state Assembly, S.F.
CHRON., June 3, 2005, at A-1 (reporting that the legislative sponsor of a failed marriage-equality
legislation said that if "this [legislature] can't pass [the bill], it should clarify its position and say we
do believe that gay and lesbian couples are second-class citizens"); Norma Love, N.H. becomes
latest state to legalize gay marriage, NEWSDAY, June 4, 2009, at A35 (reporting that a prominent
advocate of same-sex marriage characterizes passage of marriage equality legislation as "about
being recognized as whole people and whole citizens"); Tom Suozzi, Op-Ed., Why I Now Support
Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2009, at A19 (announcing his support for marriage equality
legislation in New York, saying that same-sex couples are "entitled to clear recognition of their
equal status as citizens of a country that is founded on the principle that we are all inherently worthy").
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eral court in 2010.2' Tactical questions of timing and strategy remain, and
the issue of who decides those questions is complex. 269 Litigating a politically volatile issue like marriage equality is fraught with risks. Consistent
with everything I have suggested about the interactive and dynamic relations
between courts and the political process, a loss at the Supreme Court might
well set back political efforts that have long been underway and that are,
presumably, one force responsible for producing dramatic shifts in public
opinion on same-sex marriage.270 The idea of an energetic multi-institutional
effort against relations of hierarchy, carried on under the banner of the Constitution's commitment to democratic equality, means at least taking
seriously the possibility that working through political institutions might
sometimes be preferable, even if frustratingly slow. That idea might be rejected by process theory because of its court-venerating tendencies, but it
merits consideration under a view of democratic equality that is committed
to a meaningful institutional pluralism and that focuses on identifying conditions of hierarchy and animus that are inconsistent with the idea of
democratic equality. On this view, in other words, if there is to be a new
canonical footnote placing democratic equality at the center of equal protection analysis, it ought to identify substantive conditions that are inconsistent
with equal citizenship, and it ought to inform not only judicial opinions but
legislative deliberations and public debates as well.
CONCLUSION

Political process theory has long been both central to constitutional law,
and controversial within it. The same-sex marriage debate has brought the
principle front and center, as state-and now federal-courts have struggled
to measure and define the political power of the LGBT community. The
complexities of that enterprise offer a rich, contemporary opportunity to
reassess the postulates of process theory. That reappraisal suggests that the
theory is unsustainable in its conventional form, but can and should be an
important point of departure for developing a more nuanced, institutionally
realistic, and institutionally pluralistic principle of democratic equality to
guide constitutional norms.

268. Controversy surrounded the decision of the high-profile legal team of Theodore Olson
and David Boies to file a federal court challenge after gay rights groups had declined to file. See
Jesse McKinley, Bush v. Gore Foes Join to Fight California Gay MarriageBan, N.Y. TIMES, May
28, 2009, at Al.
269. On these complexities, see William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing
Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623
(1997).
270. See Andrew Gelman et al., Over Time, a Gay MarriageGroundswell, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
22, 2010, at WK3.
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